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NOTES AND COMMENTS
THE BOUNDS OF LEGISLATIVE SPECIFICATION:
A SUGGESTED APPROACH TO THE BILL
OF ATTAINDER CLAUSE
Whereas the pretended Prince of Wales hath ... (being bred up and instructed to
introduce the Ronish Superstition and French Government into these your Ma-
jesty's Kingdoms) openly and traitorously, with Design to dethrone your Majesty,
assumed the Name and Title of James the Third . . . To the End therefore that
your Majesty's good and loyal People of England, assembled in Parliament, may in
the most solemn Manner express their utmost Resentment of so great an indignity
. . . and that the said Traitor may be brought more certainly and speedily to
condign Punishment . . . be it enacted . . . That the said pretended Prince of
Wales stand and be convicted and attainted of High Treason....
... 1700
The Congress hereby finds and declares that the Communist Party of the United
States, although purportedly a political party, is in fact an instrumentality of a
conspiracy to overthrow the Government of the United States.. . . Therefore the
Communist Party should be outlawed.
... 1954
COMMON in sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth century England were
so-called "bills of attainder," parliamentary acts sentencing to death, without a
conviction in the ordinary course of judicial trial, named or described 1 persons
or groups.2 In addition to the death sentence, it was usual to decree that there
The Journal wishes to thank Alan M. Dershowitz, LL.B. 1962, Yale Law School, for
his editorial assistance in preparation of this Comment.
1. See, e.g., the Act for the Attainder of Thomas Fitzgerald, Earl of Kildare 1534, 26
Hen. 8, c. 6 (priv.) :
... And Further be it enacted by the auctorite aforesaid, that all suche persons whilhe
be or hereafter have ben conffortours abbetours partakers confederates or adherents
unto the said Erle in his said false and trayterous acts and purpos shall in lyke wise
stonde and be atteynted adjugged and convycted of High Treason . .. And be It
further enacted . .. that the same atteynder juggement and convyccion ageynst the
said conffortours abettours ... confederates and adherents shalbe as astronge and
effectuall in the lawe ageynst them and every of them as though they and every of
them had be specially singulerly and particulerly named by their propre names and
surnames in this said Acte.
See also An Act to attaint persons concerned in the late horrid conspiracy..., 1696, 8 Will,
3, c. 5 (pub.).
2. See statutes cited supra note 1; see also 25 Hen. 8, c. 12 (pub.) (1533) ; An act for
the attainder of divers offenders in the late most barbarous, monstrous, detestable and
damnable treasons, 1605, 3 Jac. 1, c. 2 (pub.) ; an Act for the attainder of several persons
guilty of the horrid murder of his late sacred Majesty King Charles the First, 1660, 12 Car.
2, c. 30 (pub.) ; 19 Geo. 2, c. 26 (pub.) (1746) ; An act to incapacitate . . . (69 names)
from voting at elections of members to serve in parliament.... 1770, 11 Geo. 3, c. 55 (pub.).
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was a "corruption of blood"3 which prevented the attainted party's heirs from
inheriting his property.4 Also common were "bills of pains and penalties,"
which prescribed, after the fashion of bills of attainder, sanctions less than
capital. 5 Both sorts of statute were almost always directed at persons who had
attempted,6 or threatened to attempt,7 to overthrow the government. The
framers of the United States Constitution did not, however, have to scan the
Statutes of the Realm in order to appreciate the evils of attainder: our own
pre-Constitution experience provided them with ample firsthand knowledge.
The Revolutionary era was marked by violent anti-Loyalist sentiments, which
found expression in the statute books of all the thirteen colonies.8 This wave of
anti-Tory legislation included numerous bills of attainder 0 and bills of pains
and penalties.' 0 In 1789, having grown wary of such legislative excesses, the
framers-unanimously, and without debate "--moved to insure that they should
never recur:
No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto law shall be passed [by the Con-
gress].' 2
3. Corruption of blood was outlawed by the United States Constitution. U.S. CoNsr. art.
III, § 3.
4. See Exparte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 387 (1866); CHAFER, THREE Htnr.u€
RIGHTS IN THE CONSTrIUTION 96 (1956).
5. See, e.g., 13 Car. 2 St I, c. 15 (pub.) (1661) ; an Act to inflict pains and penalties on
John Plunket, 1722, 9 Geo. 1, c. 15 (pub.). See 2 WOODDESON, VInERaAn LEcruPES 638
(1792) ; STORY, CoMI-NTArIES ON THE CoNsTrruTioN OF THE UNITED STATES 210 (4th
ed. 1873) ; COOLEY, CoxsTru'oNAL LMITATIOxS 315-16 (6th ed. 1890).
The bill of attainder clause has been construed to outlaw bills and pains and penalties. See
notes 22 & 31 infra and accompanying text.
6. See, e.g., 29 Hen. 6, c. 1 (pub.) (1450) ; 13 Ellz., c. 16 (pub.) (1570) ; An act for the
attainder of divers offenders in the late most barbarous, monstrous, detestable and damnable
Treasons, 1605, 3 Jac. 1, c. 2 (pub.); An Act for continuing the imprisonment... for the
late horrid conspiracy to assassinate the person of his sacred Majesty, 1699; 10 & 11 Will.
3, c. 13 (pub.) ; An Act for the Attainder of the pretended Prince of Wales of High Treason,
1701, 13 Will. 3, c. 3 (pub.) ; An Act to inflict pains and penalties on John Plunket, 1722, 9
Geo. 1, c. 15 (pub.).
7. See notes 64-66 infra and accompanying text.
8. VAN TYxE, THE LOYALISTS IN THE AmERICAN REVOLUTION, apps. B and C (1902).
See also Thompson, Anti-Loyalist Legislation During the American Revolution (pts. 1 &
2), 3 I. L. REv. 81, 147 (1908) ; Reppy, The Spectre of Attainder in New Yor., 23 ST.
JoHN's L. REv. 1 (1948).
9. See, e.g., Attainder Act of Oct. 22, 1779, 1 Laws of New York, third session, c. XXV;
Attainder Act of May 12, 1784, 1 Laws of New York, seventh session, c. LXIV; James'
Claim, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 47 (1780); Respublica v. Gordon, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 232 (1788);
Inglis v. Sailor's Snug Harbour, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 99 (1830). See also authorities cited note
8 supra.
10. See, eg., Act of Disenfranchisement of May 12, 1784, 1, Laws of New York,
Seventh Session, c. LXVI; Cooper v. Telfair, 4 U.S. (4 DaL) 14 (1800). See generally
authorities cited note 8 supra.
11. MADISON, DEBATES IN THE FEDER.AL CONvENTION OF 1787 449 (Hunt & Scott eds.
1920).
12. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9.
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No State shall... pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto law, or Law
impairing the Obligation of Contracts.. .1
These clauses, limiting the extent to which legislatures can specify the in-
dividuals or groups to which their legislation is to apply, number among the
few specific safeguards of liberty which appear in the original body of the Con-
stitution, and also represent one of the few explicit limitations upon both
federal and state action. Although throughout our history there have been
sporadic attempts to legislate against particular persons or groups,14 until
recently the bill of attainder prohibition was seldom invoked. However, the
recent spate of legislation specifically directed at the members of the Com-
munist Party x5 has forced the Supreme Court to reexamine the scope and
purpose of the clauses.
From the early days of the Constitution through the decision of United
States v. Lovett "I in 1946, the Court treated the bill of attainder clause as a
blanket prohibition of all forms of legislative punishment 17 of specific groups.
Since the decision in American Communications Ass'n v. Douds 18 in 1950,
however, the Court has espoused the view that the historical roots of the bill
13. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 10.
14. See, e.g., notes 8-10 supra and 66 & 77 infra and accompanying text (Torles);
notes 25-37 infra and accompanying text (post-Civil War) ; Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333
(1890) (Mormons); New York ex rel. Bryant v. Zimmerman, 278 U.S. 63 (1928) (uti
Klux Klan).
15. Congress has declared the Communist Party to be unentitled to "any of the rights,
privileges, and immunities attendant upon legal bodies created under the jurisdiction of the
laws of the United States," and there are on the books specific provisions restricting the
Party's use of the nation's mails and air waves, and denying it certain income twx deduc-
tions. Communist Control Act § 3, 68 Stat. 776 (1954), 50 U.S.C. § 842 (1958) ; Subversive
Activities Control Act §§ 10, 11 (a), 64 Stat. 996 (1950), 50 U.S.C. §§ 789-90 (1958).
The individual members of the party cannot hold any non-elective government office,
work in defense facilities or for a labor union, represent either employer or employee In
National Labor Relations Act proceedings, or get a passport. Subversive Activities Control
Act §§ 5(a) (1) (B), 5(a) (1) (D), 64 Stat. 992 (1950), 50 U.S.C. §§ 784(a)(1)(13),
784(a) (1) (D) (1958) ; Communist Control Act §§ 6, 13A(h), 68 Stat. 777, 779 (1954),
50 U.S.C. §§ 784(a) (1) (E), 792a(h) (1958) ; Subversive Activities Control Act § 6(a),
64 Stat. 993 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 785(a) (1958).
Further, an alien who is a member of the Party is automatically ineligible for admisslon
(or naturalization) and, even if already admitted, is subject to deportation, at which time
his social security benefits will be terminated. Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(a)
(28) (c), 66 Stat. 184 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(28) (c) (1958) ; Immigration and Nationality
Act § 313(a) (2), 66 Stat. 240 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1424(a) (2) (1958) ; Immigration and
Nationality Act § 241(a) (6) (C), 66 Stat. 205 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (6) (C) (1958);
Social Security Act Amendments of 1954 § 107, 68 Stat. 1083, 42 U.S.C. § 402(n) (1958).
16. 328 U.S. 303 (1946).
17. The view that in order to be a bill of attainder, a statute must inflict "punishment,"
is criticized below. See notes 137-41 infra and accompanying text. However, since all the
case law speaks in these terms, this Comment, in describing the contrasting approaches to
the constitutional provision, will, for the time being, also speak in terms of "punishment."
18. 339 U.S. 382 (1950).
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of attainder proscription limit its scope to a narrowly restricted and technical-
ly defined class of legislative acts.
THE FUNCTIONAL TRADITION
If the [bill of attainder] inhibition can be evaded by the form of the en-
actment, its insertion in the fundamental law was a vain and futile pro-
ceeding.19
This "functional" view 20-interpreting the bill of attainder clause not in the
light of what "bills of attainder" were, but rather in the light of the kinds of
evils they produced-was first suggested in 1810 in Fletcher v. Peck.2 1 Chief
Justice Marshall, speaking for the Court, stated in dictum that "a bill of at-
tainder may affect the life of an individual, or may confiscate his property,
or may do both."22 This is of course a statement that what were known at com-
mon law as bills of pains and penalties 2 come within the constitutional pro-
hibition of bills of attainder. The language of the Constitution does not com-
pel such a conclusion; yet Marshall put it forth without argument. It seems
quite clear that he arrived at this result because he viewed the constitutional
provision not as a prohibition of an historically defined entity--"the bill of
attainder"--but rather as a general proscription of legislative punishment, re-
gardless of the type of sanction imposed.24
The functional approach became law in the landmark post-Civil W~ar cases
of Cumnznings v. Missouri25 and Ex parte Garland.20 At issue in Cummings
were certain amendments to the Missouri constitution of 1865 which provided
that no one could vote, hold office, teach, or hold property in trust for a re-
19. Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277,325 (1866).
20. The word "functional" is sometimes used to mean "result-oriented." This is not the
meaning here intended, for of course the "literalist" position is as result-oriented as the
position here described. Rather, "functional" is used to designate that approach which in-
terprets a constitutional provision in light of the sort of evil against which it was directed. It
thus might perhaps better be termed" historical functionalism."
21. 10U.S. (6Cranch.) 87 (1810).
22. Id. at 138 (dictum).
23. See note 5 supra and accompanying text.
24. The functional view also found expression in Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12
Wheat.) 212 (1827), a bankruptcy case which construed the obligation of contracts clause:
By classing bills of attainder, ex post facto laws, and laws impairing the obligation of
contracts together, the general intent becomes very apparent; it is a general protision
against abitrary and tyrannical legislation over existing rights, whether of person
or property.
Id. at 286 (emphasis supplied).
25. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1866).
26. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1866). Although Cnmmnings and Garland and Pierce v.
Carskadon, note 43 inlra, were the only cases to reach the Supreme Court, several post-Civil
War oath provisions were invalidated as bills of attainder. See In re Shorter, 22 Fed. Cas.
16 (No. 12811) (D. Ala. 1865) ; Exparte Law, 15 Fed. Cas. 3 (No. 8126) (S.D. Ga. 1866) ;
Green v. Shumway, 39 N.Y. 418 (1868) ; Davis v. Pierse, 7 Minn. 13 (1862). But see Ex
parte Hunter, 2 W. Va. 122 (1867).
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ligious organization, unless he first took an elaborate oath to the effect that
he had taken no part in the rebellion and would continue in his loyalty to the
United States and the State of Missouri. 27 Garland involved the constitution-
ality of a federal statute which required attorneys to take an oath, similar to
the one involved in Cummingsm as a condition of admission to practice in the
federal courts. The Court invalidated both requirements as bills of attainder
on the ground that they were legislative acts inflicting punishment upon a
specific group-those who could not truthfully take the oath-without a judi-
cial trial.29 Over the dissent of Justice Miller,30 the cases adopted Marshall's
dictum that the bill of attainder proscription covers bills of pains and penal-
ties.31 Rejecting M'Iiller's literalist tenets, 32 the majority held irrelevant the
facts that the act was in form a civil statute 33 and that it lacked the "declara-
tion of guilt" which Justice Miller 34-- and, eighty years later, Mr. justice
Frankfurter 35 -claimed was essential. The Court specifically refused to read
into the bill of attainder clause the restricted definition of "punishment" ad-
vocated by counsel for Missouri, and implied that any deprivation could con-
stitute "punishment" sufficient to render an act a bill of attainder.8,
In 1872 the Court, in a one sentence memorandum opinion in Pierce v.
Carskadon, struck down as a bill of attainder a West Virginia statute condi-
tioning access to the courts upon the taking of an oath similar to those in-
volved in Cummings and Garland.37 However, seventeen years later, in Dent
v. West Virginia,33 the Court upheld another West Virginia statute- this
one requiring physicians to obtain a license in order to practice. Appellant had
argued that because the granting of a license was conditioned upon graduat-
ing from medical school, practicing for ten years, or passing a special examina-
27. Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 280- 81 (1866).
28. Earparte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 334-5 (1866).
29. 71 U.S. at 323, 377.
30. Id. at 386-90.
31. Id. at 323.
32. See note 49 infra.
33. 71 U.S. at 278.
34. Id. at 390.
35. United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 322-23 (1946). See notes 42-45 i ra and
accompanying text.
36. See notes 148, 152-53 infra and accompanying text.
Although the oaths contained both denials of past acts and pledges of future conduct, the
Court spoke almost exclusively of the former provisions. Indeed, at one point the Court's
language suggests the requirement of post facto punishment, discussed and criticized (on
the ground of pre-Constitution history and not of precedent) infra at notes 56-67 and ac-
companying text. 71 U.S. at 321-22; see text accompanying note 155 in Ira. However, the
force of this dictum is greatly weakened by the fact that the Court apparently struck down
both oaths in toto, without distinguishing the provisions relating to the future from those
pertaining to the past.
37. Pierce v. Carskadon, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 234 (1872). See also Drehman v. Stifle,
75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 595 (1869) ; Minor v. Happersctt, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162 (1874)
Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252 (1886).
38. 129 U.S. 114 (1889).
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tion, the act constituted a legislative infliction of punishment upon those unable
to achieve one of the qualifications. The bill of attainder argument was also
rejected in Hawker v. New York,39 which involved the constitutionality of a
New York statute barring convicted felons from the practice of medicine. In
both cases, the Court accepted the Cummnings-Garland doctrine that the bill
of attainder clause prohibits legislative punishment in any guise,40 but held
that because the deprivation imposed by the statutes was reasonably related
to the activities regulated thereby, the statutes did not impose punishment at
all.41 Despite the finding of no bill of attainder, however, the absence of any
reference to allegedly historical bonds suggests that Denzt and Hawker can be
placed in the pre-Douds stream of functional interpretation.
The bill of attainder clause lay fallow until the 1946 case of United States
v. Lovett,2 which involved the constitutionality of section 304 of the Urgent
Deficiency Appropriation Act of 1943 43 prohibiting payment of further com-
pensation to Lovett and two other named federal employees. The Court, per
Mir. Justice Black, found in the legislative history of section 304 a punitive
intent " on the part of Congress, and, on the authority of Cummuings and Gar-
land, invalidated the section as a bill of attainder.
Since Lovett the Supreme Court has not condemned any statute as a bill of
attainder, although the issue has been raised at least twelve times.40 The func-
39. 170 U.S. 189 (1898).
40. Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 125-28 (1889) ; Hawker v. New York, 170
U.S. 189, 198 (1898).
41. Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 128 (1889). Hawker v. New York, 170 U.s.
189, 193-94 (1898). See note 129 infra.
A similar rationalization for the modern requirement of post facto punishment (notes
56-67 infra and accompanying text) is also available, for it could be argued that sanctions
designed to alter future conduct cannot constitute "punishment" within the traditional func-
tional definition of bill of attainder. The requirement of post facto punishment is treated as a
product of"literalism," however, because of the method by which it was derived.
The modern case law, particularly the influential Loveit concurrence, has strongly sug-
gested that all the modem requirements, including that of post facto punishment, have been
imposed by the demands of history. This was not the approach of Dent and Hawkcr. This
is not to say, of course, that Dent and Hawker could not have verbalized their conclusions
in terms of the demands of history, nor that the cases creating the requirement of post facto
punishment could not have justified their conclusion by a "literalist" hypothesis and a re-
definition of punishment.
42. 328 U.S. 303 (1946).
43. 57 Stat. 450 (1943).
44. See note 140 infra.
45. 328 U.S. 303, at 315-16. Although Lovett has never been distinguished on the ground
that the persons at whom it was aimed were actually named, that fact may be one of the rea-
sons a majority of the Court agreed that it was a bill of attainder.
46. American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 413 (1950) ; Joint Anti-
Fascist Refugee Comm. v.j McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 143 (1951) ; Garner v. Board of Public
Works, 341 U.S. 716, 722 (1951); Bailey v. Richardson, 341 U.S. 918 (1951); Linehan v.
Waterfront Commission, 347 U.S. 439, 441 (1954) ; Barsky v. Board of Regents, 347 U.S.
442,459 (1954) ; Peters v. Hobby, 349 U.S. 331, 352 (1955) ; Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U.S. 72,
108 (1959) ; Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 160 (1959) ; DeVeau v. Braisted,
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tional approach, for which Mr. Justice Black remains the chief spokesman, has
been relegated to the ranks of the dissenting opinion.47
ThE ADvENT oF LITERALISM
The decisions handed down since 1949 reject the traditional view that the bill
of attainder clause is a broad policy judgment condemning all forms of legislative
punishment, and adopt instead the position that the prohibition embraces only
a narrowly restricted, historically defined class of legislative acts.
This position cannot be sustained; attainder is scarcely known in Amer-
ican law. . . . Bills of attainder had acquired an established and tech-
nical signification long before the framing and adoption of the Constitu-
tion of the United States, and was well understood by the men who
framed that instrument .... 48
The historical lineage of this "literalist"-or strict historical-approach
dates back at least as far as Cummings and Garland, where Justice Miller, dis-
senting from the holding of the Court in both cases and purportedly using his-
tory as his guide, drafted a list of "essential elements of bills of attainder." 4
The approach made its modern debut in Mr. Justice Frankfurter's concurrence
in United States v. Lovett ° an opinion which has subsequently achieved such
status that it is now cited as authority.r1 One of the grounds for Mr. Justice
Frankfurter's unwillingness to concur in the majority's finding that the statute
in issue was a bill of attainder was the absence of a recital of the acts of which
Lovett, Watson, and Dodd were guilty. 2 This requirement of a "declaration of
guilt" would of course permit a legislature, merely by omitting its ground of
condemnation, to avoid having invalidated as a bill of attainder a statute im-
363 U.S. 144, 160 (1960) ; Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 612-21 (1960) ; Communist
Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 82-8 (1961).
47. See, e.g., American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, supra note 46; Garner v.
Board of Public Works, supra note 46; Barsky v. Board of Regents, supra note 46; Uphaus
v. Wyman, supra note 46; Barenblatt v. United States, supra note 46; Flemming v. Nestor,
supra note 46; Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., supra note 46.
48. Green v. Shumway, 39 N.Y. 418, 430-31 (1868) (Mason, J., dissenting).
49. 71 U.S. at 386-90.
50. -328 U.S. 303, 318 (1946). It might be argued that Dent v. West Virginia, 129
U.S. 114 (1889), and Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189 (1898), are precursors of the
literalist approach. Such a conclusion would seem to stem from a concentration upon re-
sults rather than method and is not accepted by this Comment. Note 41 supra.
51. See National Maritime Union v. Herzog, 78 F. Supp. 146, 164 (D.D.C. 1948),
aff'd, 334 U.S. 854 (1948).
52. All bills of attainder specify the offense for which the attainted person was deemed
guilty... There was always a declaration of guilt.... § 304 lack[s] the essential
declaration of guilt....
328 U.S. at 322-23.
Congress omitted from § 304 any condemnation for which the presumed punishment
was a sanction. Thereby it negatived the essential notion of a bill of attainder.
Id. at 326 (emphasis supplied).
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prisoning named parties.53 The requirement accords with neither precedent 0
nor history;55 it has not been accepted by a majority of the Court. Other liter-
alist tenets first suggested in the Lovett concurrence, however, have become
law, and have been reaffirmed several times.
The Requirement of Post Facto Punishment
In his concurrence in Lovett, Mr. Justice Frankfurter stressed the fact that
the legislation which the majority held to be a bill of attainder did not purport
to inflict punishment for a past act.r0 This suggestion was adopted by the
majority in American Communications Ass'n v. Douds,5 7 a case involving the
constitutionality of section 9(h) of the Taft-Hartley Act, s which conditioned
recognition of a labor union upon the filing of affidavits by its officers that they
were not members of the Communist Party. In rejecting petitioner's claim that
the statute was a legislative imposition of punishment upon members of the
Communist Party and therefore a bill of attainder, the Court distinguished
Cuminigs, Garland and Lovett on the ground that in those decisions
... the individuals involved were in fact being punished for past actions;
whereas in this case they are subject to possible loss only because there
is substantial ground for the congressional judgment that their beliefs and
loyalties will be transformed into future conduct. Of course, the history
of the past conduct is the foundation for the judgment as to what the
future conduct is likely to be; but that does not alter the conclusion that
§ 9(h) is intended to prevent future action rather than to punish past
action.5 9
The principle that in order to be invalidated as a bill of attainder a piece of
legislation must be designed primarily to punish past acts rather than to pre-
vent future action was recently reaffirmed in Communist Party of the United
53. Mr. Justice Frankfurter admits this danger. See id. at 326. But, he argues, other
constitutional safeguards provide sufficient protection from such legislative action. But see
note 195 infra.
54. The requirement is of course out of line with the functional approach taken by the
early decisions. See notes 19-47 supra and accompanying text. There is also explicit language
in the Cummings opinion which strongly suggests that the absence of a declaration of guilt is
a mere formal technicality and should not be dispositive. 71 U.S. at 324-25.
55. See an Act for the Attainder of Thomas Earl of Strafford of High Treason, 1640,
16 Car. 1, c. i (priv.) ; 12 Car. 1, c. 1 (1641) ; 2 WOODDESON, op. cit. stspra note 5, at 629-33.
56. 328 U.S. at 322-25.
57. 339 U.S. 382 (1950).
58. Ch. 120, 61 Stat. 146 (1947), repealed, 73 Stat. 525 (1959). But see Communist
Control Act § 6, 68 Stat. 777 (1954), 50 U.S.C. § 784(a) (1) (E) (1958).
59. 339 U.S. at 413-14. Accord: Albertson v. Millard, 106 F. Supp. 635, 644-45 ( E.D.
Mich. 1952) ; Weinstock v. Ladisky, 197 Misc. 859, 875, 98 N.Y.S2d 85, 100-01 (Sup. Ct.
1950) ; Dworken v. Collopy, 91 N.E2d 564, 570 (Ohio C.P. 1950) ; Huntamer v. Coe, 40
Wash. 2d 767, 776,246 P.2d 489, 494 (1952) ; Peters v. New York City Housing Authority,
9 Misc. 2d 942, 950, 128 N.Y.S2d 224,235 (Sup. Ct 1953), re-,d on other grounds 307 N.Y.
519, 121 N.E.2d 529 (1954) ; Board of Education v. Cooper, 289 P.2d 80, 87 (Cal. Dist. Ct.
App. 1955).
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States v. Subversive Activities Control Board.60 It is, however, a principle
belied by the history from which its proponents contend it was culled. It is
true that most of the English bills of attainder were passed by way of retribu-
tion for past deeds ;01 indeed, some of them, notably that attainting Oliver
Cromwell, 62 were enacted after the death of the person attainted. 5 But this
was not always the case; some English bills of attainder were passed in order
to prevent certain types of future conduct on the part of the person or group
attainted. An example is furnished by the "Act for the Attainder of the pre-
tended Prince of Wales of High Treason" of 17D." There the announced in-
tention of Parliament in passing the attainder was "that the said traitor may be
brought more certainly and speedily to condign Punishment." That one of the
reasons for their wanting him speedily executed was fear of his possible future
revolutionary actions may be demonstrated by the second section of the Act,
which declared anyone corresponding with the Prince or his followers to be
guilty of treason.05
The historical inaccuracy of the requirement of post facto punishment is
further demonstrated by the many colonial bills of attainder, which were
enacted in order to prevent effective resistence to the Revolution by the
Tories. 6 Undoubtedly the attainder of the Tories (and that of the Prince of
60. 367 U.S. 1, 86-87 (1961).
61. See, e.g., Attainder of John Cade, 1450, 29 Hen. 6, c. 1; The convictions of T. Earl of
Westmorland, and fifty-seven others attainted of treason, 1570, 13 Eliz., c. 16 (pub.).
62. An Act for the Attainder of several Persons guilty of the horrid Murder of his late
Sacred Majesty King Charles the First, 1660, 12 Car. 2, c. 30 (pub.).
63. The post morten attainder was more than an empty gesture, for it added the de-
privation of corruption of blood. See note 4 supra.
64. 13 Will. 3, c. 3 (pub.).
65. Statute quoted note 187 infra.
... 9 Hen. 4 an act of parliament was made, that all the Irish people should depart the
realm, and go into Ireland before the Feast of the Nativity of the Blessed Lady,
upon pain of death....
Case of Proclamations, 12 Co. Rep. 75-76, 77 Eng. Rep. 1354 (K.B. 1610). See also Professor
Chafee's account of the attainder of Thomas Haxley. CHAFEE, op. cit. supra note 4, at 102-03.
If the ousted adviser were left at liberty, he could readily turn his resentment into
coercion or rebellion and make a magnificent comback to the utter ruin of those wlto
had driven him from his high place.
Id. at 103-04.
66. Widespread Tory resistance to the Revolution led, understandably, to fear on the
part of the Revolutionists. See Thompson, supra note 8, at 81-84. This fear crystallized in
many sorts of anti-Loyalist legislation, among which were numerous bills of attainder and
bills of pains and penalties. See notes 9 & 10 supra; see generally authorities cited note 8
supra.
The prophylactic purpose of much of this legislation is aptly summed up by the title of
a 1777 Maryland act: "An Act to punish certain crimes and misdemeanors, and to prevent the
growth of toryism." 1 Laws of Maryland 453 (Kilty 1799).
The fact that many of the statutes were repealed as soon as the war-and therefore the
Tory danger-was ended lends credence to the view that their purpose was not primarily
retribution for past misdeeds. See Thompson, supra note 8, at 170-71.
See also SToPY, op. cit. slipra note 10, at 211 n.1.
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Wales) was motivated in part by a desire for retribution for past acts, but
the same can be said-as Douds essentially admitted 67-of much of today's
anti-Communist legislation. Nonetheless, these historical examples demonstrate
that the primary purpose of some pre-Constitution bills of attainder was to pre-
vent certain types of future action on the part of the individuals attainted.
The Requirement of the Inescapable Class
In holding that section 9(h) of the Taft-Hartley Act was not a bill of at-
tainder, the Douds majority established another requirement-that of the in-
escapable class.68
[T]here is no one who may not by a voluntary alteration of the loyalties
which impel him to action, become eligible to sign the affidavit. We can-
not conclude that this section is a bill of attainder.00
The requirement of the inescapable class also was reaffirmed in Communist
Party of the United States v. Subversive Activities Control Board,70 which
upheld an order of the Board requiring the Communist Party to register as a
"Communist-action organization" under section 7 of the Subversive Activities
Control Act. 71 Although the Court refused to pass upon the constitutionality of
those sections of the act which spell out the consequences of such registration,
and restricted itself to a consideration of the validity of the registration pro-
vision alone, 72 it indulged in language broad enough to lay a foundation for
holding that no section of the act is a bill of attainder:
So long as the incidence of legislation is such that the persons who en-
gage in the regulated conduct, be they many or few, can escape regulation
merely by altering the course of their own activities, there can be no com-
plaint of an attainder.73
At one level, it may be questioned whether a member of the Communist
Party is presented with a live option by legislation like section 9(h) of the
Taft-Hartley Act. Further, those who claim to be following the dictates of
history again are defeated by their own premises, for the doctrine that there can
be no finding of attainder if the members of the class at which the statute is
directed cannot escape the prescribed deprivation-like the requirement of
post facto punishment--cannot be sustained historically. As the opinion of
Judge Nicholas in the early Kentucky case of Doe ex. demn. Gaines v. Biuford
stated:
A British act of parliament might declare, that if certain individuals, or
a class of individuals, failed to do a given act by a named day, they should
67. See text accompanying note 59 .rpra.
68. This requirement too was originally suggested in the Lovett concurrence. 328 U.S.
at 327.
69. 339 U.S. at 414.
70. 367U.S.1 (1961).
71. See notes 183-87 infra and accompanying text.
72. 367 U.S. at 82.
73. Id.at 88.
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be deemed to be, and treated, as convicted felons or traitors. Such an act
comes precisely within the definition of a bill of attainder .... 74
It was common for English acts of attainder to permit members of the specified
class to escape the attainder. Frequently they could do so by surrendering by a
specified day:
An Act to attaint Alexander Earl of Kellie, William Viscount of Strathal-
Ian, Alexander Lord Pitsligo ... of High Treason, if they shall not render
themselves to one of His Majesty's Justices of the Peace, on or before
the twelfth Day of July in the Year of Our Lord one thousand seven
hundred and forty-six, and submit to Justice."
The choice between attainder and surrender was not the Hobson's choice it
initially appears to be. For by granting the attainted party the option of "sub-
mitting to Justice," Parliament gave him the opportunity to be tried by a
court, under the existing statutory law and with all the safeguards of a judicial
trial. If, on the other hand, he elected not to surrender, he could make no de-
fense to Parliament's ad hoc determination of guilt.
Moreover, the attainder conditioned upon surrender is not the only form of
conditional attainder to be found in the Statutes of the Realm. The bill against
the Earl of Clarendon, passed during the reign of Charles the Second, per-
petually banished the Earl; it further provided, however, that if he returned
to England, he would then be made to suffer the pains and penalties of trea-
son.76 The conditional form is characteristic also of some colonial bills of at-
tainder.77
In Cummings v. Missouri the Court observed that bills of attainder "may in-
flict punishment absolutely, or may inflict it conditionally. 1 8 Thus in establish-
ing the requirement of the inescapable class, Douds and Communist Party dis-
regarded explicit precedent as well as pre-Constitution history. The literalists
claim to derive their definition of attainder from history; yet history belies
their conclusions as to both the requirement of the inescapable class and the
requirement of punishment for past acts.
THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF NARROW HISTORICAL DEFINITION
In his Lovett concurrence, Mr. Justice Frankfurter argued that the Consti-
tution is an amalgam of flexible and inflexible mandates:
74. 31 Ky. (1 Dana) 481, 510 (1833) (separate opinion, 2 judges participating).
75. 1746, 19 Geo. 2, c. 26 (pub.). Also of this form are, e.g., an Act of Banishing and
Disenabling the Earl of Clarendon, 1667, 19 Car. 2, c. 10 (pub.) ; An act to attaint such of
the persons concerned in the late horrid conspiracy to assassinate his Majesty's royal person,
1696, 8 Will. 3, c. 5 (pub.) ; An Act for the Attainder of Henry Viscount Bolingbroke, 1714,
1 Geo. 1 Stat. 2, c. 16 (pub.); An Act for the attainder of James Duke of Ormonde, 1714,
1 Geo. 1 Stat. 2, c. 17 (pub.) ; An Act for the attainder of George Earl of Mariscliall, 1715,
1 Geo. 1 Stat. 2, c. 42 (pub.).
76. An Act for banishing and disenabling the Earl of Clarendon, 1667, 19 Car. 2, e. 10
(pub.), printed in 6 Howell's State Trials, p. 391, cited 71 U.S. at 324.
77. See, e.g., An Act to Attaint Josiah Philips, 1778, 9 Laws of Virginia 463 (Hening
1821) ; Pemberton's Lessee v. Hicks, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 479 (1798),
78. 71 U.S. at 324.
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Broadly speaking, two types of constitutional claims come before this
Court. Most constitutional issues derive from the broad standards of fair-
ness written into the Constitution (e.g., "due process," "equal protection
of the laws," "just compensation"), and the division of power as between
States and Nation. Such questions, by their very nature, allow a relatively
wide play for individual legal judgment. The other class gives no such
scope. For the second class of constitutional issues derives from very
specific provisions of the Constitution. These had their source in definite
grievances and led the Fathers to proscribe against recurrence of their
experience. These specific grievances and the safeguards against their re-
currence were not defined by the Constitution. They were defined by
history. Their meaning was so settled by history that definition was super-
fluous. Judicial, enforcement of the Constitution must respect these historic
limits.
7 9
Even granting the general soundness of the flexible-inflexible dichotomy-a
distinction to which neither the Court in general,80 nor Mr. Justice Frankfur-
ter in particular,81 has consistently adhered-it would appear that M Ir. Justice
Frankfurter erred in its application when he concluded that "[t] he prohibition
of bills of attainder falls of course among these very specific constitutional
provisions."82 For "bill of attainder"-like "due process"--is not specifically
defined by history. The terms "bill of attainder" and "bill of pains and penal-
ties" (which, Mr. Justice Frankfurter agrees,83 fall within the constitutional
prohibition) covered many types of statutes. Some pre-Constitution bills of at-
79. 328 U.S. at 321. See also Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 169-70 (1952).
80. For example, the word "writings," as it appears in the copyright clause, is on its
face as inflexible as any which appears in the Constitution.
The Congress shall have Power... To promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right
to their respective Writing and Discoveries ....
U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8. See dissent of Justices Douglas and Black in Mazer v. Stein, 347
U.S. 201, 219 (1954).
Yet "writings" has been construed to cover, inter alia, maps [Amsterdam v. Triangle
Publications, Inc., 189 F.2d 104 (3d Cir. 1951) (dictum)], paintings [Leigh v. Gerber, 86
F. Supp. 320 (S.D.N.Y. 1949)], photographs [Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony,
111 U.S. 53 (1884) ], and lamp bases shaped like "male and female dancing figures" (Mazer
v. Stein, supra at 202). There are sound policy considerations underlying this broad inter-
pretation, but the fact remains that the copyright clause provides a beautiful example of the
flexible interpretation of an inflexible constitutional term.
Further, the copyright provision deals with rights as between private parties, whereas
the bill of attainder clause protects the rights of the individual against the state. Thus, it
would seem that the broader interpretation ought to be accorded the latter. For in this age of
extremely broad interpretation of those constitutional provisions permissive of government
action [See, e.g., Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954) ; Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111
(1942).] the tethering of constitutional restrictions on government action to allegedly
historical requirements will have as its inevitable result a situation which "may justly be pro-
nounced the very definition of tyranny."
81. Mr. Justice Frankfurter joined in the opinion of the Court in Mfazer v. Stein, note
80 supra.
82. 328 U.S. at 321.
83. Id. at 323-24.
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tainder specifically named the parties attainted ;81 others merely described the
class of persons upon whom the penalties were to be levied. 85 Most recited the
acts of which the attainted parties were guilty ;86 a few did not.81 The statutes
prescribed a wide variety of sanctions, ranging from death and corruption of
blood 88 to such penalties as exile.89 deprivation of the right to vote,0 and
the exclusion of the sons of the attainted parties from Parliament. 1 As noted
above, some bills of attainder punished for past deeds; others were passed pri-
marily to prevent future conduct. And some provided an escape from the class
of those attainted, while others did not.02
It thus comes as no surprise that those who have relied upon the history of
attainder have been contradicted by that history. The search for a narrow
historical definition of "bill of attainder" was from the beginning destined to be
abortive, for the term lacks a narrowly restricted historical referent. It is true
that many historical bills of attainder do meet the requirements propounded by
the recent cases. 3 The literalists have not misread particular statutes; their
error is rather one of over-extrapolation, of assuming that what is true of some
bills of attainder must be true of all.
If the meaning of "bill of attainder" had been "settled by history," defini-
tion of the term in the Constitution would indeed have been superflous, 94 But
its meaning was not settled; the variety of historical bills of attainder rendered
the concept vague. Thus it would seem that if the framers had intended the
constitutional provision to apply to only a rigidly defined class of statutes, they
would have given the term specific content. But their writings give us no such
definition; on the contrary, they demonstrate that the bill of attainder clause
was intended to be a broad implementation of the separation of powers, a
84. E.g., An Act to inflict pains and penalties on John Plunket, 1722, 9 Geo. 1, c. 15
(pub.) ; An Act to attaint Alexander, Earl of Kellie, (and others), 1746, 19 Geo. 2, e. 26
(pub.).
85. Note 1 sipra.
86. E.g., 25 Hen. 8, c. 12 (pub.) (1533) ; An Act for the attainder of several persons
guilty of the horrid murder of his late sacred Majesty King Charles the First, 1660, 12 Car.
2, c. 30 (pub.).
87. Note 55 supra. But see note 52 supra and accompanying text.
88. See note 4 supra and accompanying text.
89. See, e.g., An Act to inflict pains and penalties on Francis Lord Bishop of Rochester,
1722, 9 Geo. 1, c. 17 (pub.); Proceedings Against Hugh and Hugh Le Despencer, 1 State
Trials 23 (1320).
90. See, e.g., An Act to incapacitate John Burnett, e0 al., from voting at elections of
members to serve in parliament..., 1770, 11 Geo. 3, c. 55 (pub.).
91. See The Sons of the persons before attainted excluded from Parliament, 1397, 21
Rich. 2, c. 6 (pub.).
92. See notes 61-66, 75-77 supra and accompanying text.
93. See notes 61-62 supra and accompanying text. Also, most pre-Constitution bills of
attainder fulfilled the requirement of the inescapable class. See, e.g., An Act to attaint
James Duke of Monmouth of high-treason, 1685, 1 Jac. 2, c. 2 (pub.) ; An Act to attaint
Sir John Fenwick baronet of high treason, 1696, 8 Will. 3, c. 4 (pub.).
94. See text accompanying note 79 supra.
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general safeguard against the combination of the legislative and adjudicatory
powers, or more simply-trial by legislature.
BILLS OF ATTAINDER AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS
One of the ways in which the founding fathers sought to avoid tyranny was
by building into the Constitution the doctrine of separation of powers. This
means that each branch--executive, judicial, and legislative-has specific func-
tions which are not to be encroached upon by the others. The doctrine thus at-
tempts to assure that no single body can alone effectuate the total policy of gov-
ernment. A given policy can, in theory, be effectuated only by a combination of
legislative enactment, judicial application, and executive implementation. For
example, article III's grant of power limits the judiciary to the adjudication of
"cases and controversies" within the federal sphere of authority.0 It is of
course impossible to define with precision those areas in which courts can
under no circumstances act. At the outer limit such restrictions may be obvi-
ous, but in general the case and controversy limitation must be viewed as a
broad judgment that a variety of types of problems are in varying degrees in-
appropriate for judicial resolution.90
The section proscribing bills of attainder, on the other hand, establishes that
there are certain types of decision that are in varying degrees 97 inappropriate
for legislative resolution, although specific definition of those limitations again
appears impossible. Writings contemporary with the drafting of the Constitu-
tion express great concern lest the legislature assume the power to imple-
ment the total policy of government without the participation of the other
branches, and support the thesis that the bill of attainder clause should be
viewed as a limitation on legislatures fully as broad, and as necessary to the
effective separation of powers, as that which has been imposed upon courts by
article III.
Early formulations of the doctrine of separation of powers, notably that of
Montesquieu, demonstrate that it was in large part founded upon a belief that
fractionalization of the various functions of government would serve to safe-
guard the liberties of the citizenry:
95. The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under
this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under their Authority,-to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Minis-
ters and Consuls ;--to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction ;-to Con-
troversies to which the United States shall be a Party;-to Controversies beheen
two or more States;--between a State and Citizens of another State;-betwecn
Citizens of different States ;--between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands
under Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and
foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.
U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 2. See notes 110-13 infra and accompanying text.
96. Cf. Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 345-48 (1936)
(Brandeis, J., concurring).
97. See notes 123-25 infra and accompanying text.
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Again, there is no liberty, if the judiciary power be not separated from
the legislative and executive. Were it joined with the legislative, the life
and liberty of the subject would be exposed to arbitrary control; for thejudge would be then the legislator. Were it joined to the executive power,
the judge might behave with violence and oppression. 8
The statutes of Revolutionary America bore ample witness to the dangers of
the combined exercise of the legislative and adjudicatory functions. 9 Mon-
tesquieu's thought is clearly reflected in the writings of James Madison:
The accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in
the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary,
self-appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of
tyranny.10
A careful reading of Federalists 47, 48, 49 and 51 reveals that usurpation on
the part of the legislature was what worried Madison and Hamilton most. As
Madison noted:
In a government where numerous and extensive prerogatives are placed
in the hands of an hereditary monarch, the executive department is veryjustly regarded as the source of danger .... But in a representative re-
public, where the executive magistracy is carefully limited, both in the
extent and the duration of its power; and where the legislative power
is exercised by an assembly, which is inspired by a supposed influence
over the people, with an intrepid confidence in its own strength; which
is sufficiently numerous to feel all the passions which actuate a multitude,
yet, not so numerous as to be incapable of pursuing the objects of its
passions, by means which reason prescribes; it is against the enterprising
ambition of this department that the people ought to indulge all their
jealousy and exhaust all their precautions.10 1
The bill of attainder prohibition was therefore looked to as a vital safeguard of
the separation of powers:
98. MoTEsQuiEu, THE SP1rrr OF LAWs 154 (6th ed. 1792) (translated by Nugent).
See generally Sharp, The Classical American Doctrine of "The Separation of Powers," 2
U. Cis. L. REv. 385 (1935).
99. See notes 8-10, 66 and 77 supra and accompanying text.
The thoughtful reader will not fail to discover, in the acts of the American States
during the Revolutionary period, sufficient reason for this constitutional provision,
even if the still more monitory history of the English attainders had not been so
freshly remembered.
Coor.y, op. cit. supra note 5, at 316.
100. THE FEDERALIST No. 47, The Meaning of the Maxim, which Requires a Separation
of the Departments of Power, Examined and Ascertained, at 373-74 (Hamilton ed, 1880)
(Madison).
101. Id., No. 48, The Same Subject Continued, With a Vicw to the Means of Giving
Efficacy in Practice to that Maxim, at 383-84.
The legislative department derives a superiority in our governments from other
circumstances. Its constitutional powers being at once more extensive, and less
susceptible of precise limits, it can, with the greater facility, mask, under complicated
and indirect measures, the encroachments which it makes on the co-ordinate depart-
ments.
Id., No. 48 at 384 (Madison).
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Bills of attainder, [and] ex post facto laws ... are contrary to the first
principles of the social compact, and to every principle of sound legisla-
tion.... Our own experience has taught us . . . that additional fences
against these dangers ought not to be omitted. ... The sober people of
America are weary of the fluctuating policy which has directed the public
councils. They have seen with regret and with indignation, that sudden
changes, and legislative interferences, in cases affecting personal rights,
become jobs in the hands of enterprising and influential speculators; and
snares to the more industrious and less informed part of the commun-
ity. 0 2
The danger of attainder to which Madison had alluded were subsequently
spelled out more explicitly by Story:
In such cases, the legislature assumes judicial magistracy, pronouncing
upon the guilt of the party without any of the common forms and guards
of trial, and satisfying itself with proofs, when such proofs are within
its reach, whether they are conformable to the rules of evidence or not.
In short, in all such cases, the legislature exercises the highest power of
sovereignty, and what may be properly deemed an irresponsible despotic
discretion, being governed solely by what it deems political necessity or
expediency, and too often under the influence of unreasonable fears, or un-
founded suspicions.' 03
Thus the dual rationale of the separation of powers-fear of overconcentra-
tion of power in any one branch, and a feeling that the methods of selection
and institutional trappings render the various departments suited for different
jobs 104 is reflected in the bill of attainder clause. Not only was there a
general fear of legislative power on the part of the founding fathers, but there
was also a specific realization that the legislative branch of government is more
susceptible than the judiciary to such influences as passion, prejudice, personal
solicitation, and political motives, 0 5 and that it is not bound to respect all the
102. Id., No. 44, The Same View [Powers proposed to be Vested in the Union] Con-
tinued and Concluded, at 351 (Madison).
103. STORY, op. cit. supra note 5, at 210.
In these instances the legislature assumes judicial magistracy, weighing the enormity
of the charge, and the proof adduced in support of it, and then deciding the political
necessity and moral fitness of the penal judgment.
2 WVOODDESON, op. cit. supra note 5, at 621-22.
104. Compare Bickel & Wellington, Legislative Purpose and the Judicial Process: The
Lincoln Mills Case, 71 HAnv. L. REv. 1 (1957).
105. Some hundreds of gentlemen, every one of whom had much more than half made
up his mind before the case was opened, performed the functions both of judge and
jury. They were not restrained, as a judge is restrained, by the sense of responsi-
bility.... They were not selected, as a jury is selected, in a manner which enables
the culprit to exclude his personal and political enemies.
The arbiters of his fate came in and went out as they chose. They heard a fragment
here and there... During the progress of the bill they were exposed to every species
of influence. One member was threatened by the electors of his borough with the
loss of his seat; another might obtain a frigate for his brother... In the debates
arts were practised and passions excited which are unknown to well constituted
tribunals, but from which no great popular assembly divided into parties ever ms
or ever will be free.
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safeguards placed upon judicial trials.106 The bill of attainder clause is an
implementation of their judgment that these factors render the legislature a
tribunal inappropriate to decide who comes within the purview of its general
rules:
Every one must concede that a legislative body, from its numbers and
organization, and from the very intimate dependence of its members upon
the people, which renders them liable to be peculiarly susceptible to popti-
lar clamor, is not properly constituted to try with coolness, caution, and
impartiality a criminal charge, especially in those cases in which the popu-
lar feeling is strongly excited,--the very class of cases most likely to be
prosecuted by this mode.10 7
A third justification for a system of separation of powers-one which was
not explicitly suggested by the founding fathers-is rooted in the desirability
of legislative disclosure of its purposes. When one branch may both enact and
apply, it may more easily veil its real motive and even its true target. For
instance, if Congress wanted to punish Catholics, it could merely enact a
statute calling for the punishment of all litterbugs, and-by selective enforce-
ment and veiled adjudication-punish only those litterbugs who are also
Catholics. If, however, the statute could be applied only by another branch,
Congress could not achieve its desired purpose without articulating it at least
clearly enough for the other branches to implement it. Thus separating policy
MACAULAY, HISTORY OF ENGLAND ch. 22 (1st ed. 1855), quoted in CHAFEE, Op. Cit. st1pra
note 4, at 135.
See Pound, Justice According to Law II, 14 COLUm. L. Rav. 1, 7-12 (1914).
It is therefore proposed that the founding fathers would not have agreed with Professors
Bickel and Wellington that:
... Congress cannot normally be expected also to be aware that some of the means
chosen to achieve immediate ends impinge in not easily apparent fashion on values of
permanent significance. Were this not so the Constifution . . . could be lell to the
care of Congress alone.
Bickel & Wellington, supra note 104, at 27 (emphasis added).
106. See Comment, 63 YAI L.J. 844, 859-60 (1954). See Professor Chafee's description
of how Parliament enacted attainders. CuAF, op. cit. supra note 4, at 112, 132.
107. COOLEY, op. cit. supra note 5, at 314. See also 1 WATSON, CONSTITUTION 733-39
(1910).
Historically, the "bill of attainder" and the "impeachment" were regarded as two alter-
native ways of accomplishing the same results. See, e.g., CHAM, op. cit. supra note 4, at
98-144; ADAMS, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND 228 (Rev. ed. 1934).
To insure that the bill of attainder clause's prohibition of legislative adjudication would
not be evaded by the device of calling the proscribed action an "impeachment," the legisla-
ture's traditional impeachment power was severely narrowed. Congress was forbidden to
impeach anyone other than a government official; and even then the sanction was limited to
removal and disqualification from office.
Judgement in Cases of Impeachment shall not extend further than to removal fron
Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office of honor, Trust, or Profit
under the United States ....
U.S. CorsT. art. I, § 3. This clause may therefore be viewed as a grant to Congress of the




making from application has the additional virtue of requiring relatively clear
and candid articulation of the legislative purpose. By requiring the legislature
to expose its purpose for observation, the political processes are given a fuller
opportunity to react to it.30s And the judiciary is better able to judge the
validity of the purpose and to assure that it violates no constitutional restric-
tions. 09
Thus the bill of attainder clause (coupled with the prohibition of ex post
facto laws) can be viewed as serving a function analogous to article III's re-
striction on judicial action."10 Roughly, article III, by limiting federal courts
to cases and controversies, tells them, at least in theory, two things. First, they
-unlike the legislature-may not create broad rules; they must content them-
selves with applying the law, either statutory or constitutional,"' to the
particular disputes before them."2 And second, because they are restricted
to adjudicating the rights of the litigants before them, they can act only ret-
rospectively." 3 On the other hand, the prohibition of ex post facto laws (and
notions rooted in due process and the obligation of contracts clause) 114 tell
the legislature that in general it can act only prospectively. The bill of attainder
clause, it is submitted, is a broad prohibition completing the legislative analogue
of article III. For it tells legislatures that they may not apply their mandates
to specific parties; they instead must leave the job of application to other
tribunals.
Article III has been construed to prevent federal courts from encroaching on
the prospective rulemaking power granted the legislature by article I; and
similarly the section proscribing bills of attainder and ex post facto laws should
be construed to prevent legislatures from encroaching on the power granted
exclusively to courts by article III-the power to apply the law to particular
individuals. Thus article III, when viewed against the background of the
bill of attainder and ex post facto prohibitions, should be construed at once as
a limitation on, and a grant of exclusive authority to, the federal courts: they
can decide only cases and controversies, and only they can decide cases and
controversies. As Jefferson noted:
One hundred and seventy-three despots would surely be as oppressive as
one .... For this reason, the convention which passed the ordinance of
108. Cf. Note, 70 YALE L.J. 1192, 1199 (1961).
109. Cf. Robinson v. California, 369 U.S. 824 (1962).
110. It is not suggested that the founding fathers explicitly regarded Article III and
the bill of attainder clause as analogous provisions. Article III is brought in only as a
convenient analogy, a helpful tool for suggesting the broad %ay in which this Comment
proposes that the bill of attainder clause should be interpreted.
111. In adjudicating the constitutionality of a federal or state statute, a court "applies"
the "supreme law"--the Constitution-to the statute in question to determine whether or not
the statute is "law" at all. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch.) 137 (1803).
112. See AroqLD, THE SYMBOLS oF GovE.RxEN 178 (1935).
113. Cf. Comment, Prospective Overruling and Retroactive Application in the Federal
Courts, 71 YALE L.J. 907 (1962).
114. Cf.. Calabresi, Retroactivity: Paramount Powers and Contractual Changes, 71
YALE L.J. 1191 (1962).
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government, laid its foundation on this basis, that the legislative, execu-
tive, and judiciary departments should be separate and distinct, so that
no one person should exercise the powers of more than one of them at
the same time.... If... the legislature assumes executive and judiciary
powers, no opposition is likely to be made; nor, if made, can be effectual;
because in that case, they may put their proceedings into the form of an
act of assembly, which will render them obligatory on the other branches.
They have accordingly, in niany instances decided rights, which should
have been left to judicial controversy.... 116
Or, to put it another way, the bill of attainder and ex post facto law prohibi-
tions, when viewed against the background of articles I and III, may be
construed as a limitation on, and a grant of exclusive authority to, Congress:
only it can enact broad prospective rules without reference to particular per-
sons, and it can enact only broad prospective rules without reference to particular
persons. As Chief Justice Marshall observed in Fletcher v. Peck:
It is the peculiar province of the legislature, to prescribe general rules for
the government of society; the application of those rules to individuals in
society would seem to be the duty of other departments.1 10
Thus an analysis of the pre-Constitution bills of attainder and contemporary
commentaries indicates that the prohibition of bills of attainder is not a tech-
nical provision meant to apply only to a rigidly defined class of statutes. The
commentaries emphasize the evident-but oft neglected-fact that separation
of powers cannot be implemented unless each of the branches sought to be
separated is effectively limited to its proper sphere of activity. Emphasis has
most frequently been placed on the necessity of limiting courts to the adjudica-
tion of cases and controversies ;11 and to be sure this is important. But it is
at least as important to prevent the legislature from exercising the judicial
function. In fact, the founding fathers were more concerned with legislative
than judicial usurpation; the bill of attainder prohibition would seem to be
their way of implementing this concern. It should be broadly construed in this
spirit.
TRIAL BY LEGISLATURE
It would seem, then, that section 9(h) of the Taft-Hartley Act, which was
upheld in the Douds case,'18 should have been held a bill of attainder. Congress
can decree that persons who, because of their disloyalty, are likely to obstruct
the flow of commerce shall not be officers of labor unions. But when Congress
refuses to content itself with enacting this general rule, and goes on to say
who-be it Gus Hall or all members of the Communist Party-is to be sub-
jected to the prescribed deprivations, it oversteps its bounds.
115. JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 195 (1784), quoted in TEr FEOnRAL-
IsT No. 48, op. cit. supra note 100, at 385-86.
116. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch.) 87, 136 (1810).
117. See, e.g., Bickel & Wellington, mupra note 104.
118. See notes 57-59,69 .stpra and accompanying text.
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But the Court found no bill of attainder. In upholding the statute the major-
ity concluded that:
It is sufficient to say that Congress had a great mass of material before
it which tended to show that Communists and others prescribed by the
statute had infiltrated union organizations not to support and further trade
union objectives ... but to make them a device by which commerce and
industry might be disrupted when the dictates of political policy required
such action.119
Mr. justice Frankfurter, concurring, agreed that this sort of judgment- if
made reasonably-is one properly within the legislative province:
It must suffice for me to say that the judgment of Congress that trade
unions which are guided by officers who are committed by ties of member-
ship to the Communist Party must forego the advantages of the Labor
Management Relations Act is reasonably related to the accomplishment
of the purposes which Congress constitutionally had a right to pursue.120
justice Jackson's concurrence also reiterates this theme.'-" He carefully re-
viewed the empirical data examined by Congress and decided that:
Congress could rationally conclude that, behind its political party fagade,
the Communist Party is a conspiratorial and revolutionary junta...
To use "reasonableness" as a criterion for determining the validity of an
application of a broad policy judgment to a particular group, however, is to
employ a wholly inapposite test. The "reasonableness test" was originally de-
vised in a wholly distinct constitutional context. It was designed to define the
scope of judicial review of broad legislative policy judgments.'" Of course
a legislature can-indeed, our political system insists upon it-assemble and
evaluate empirical evidence as an aid in arriving at intelligent broad political
judgments. The reasonableness test was created to insure that courts would not
119. 339 U.S. at 389.
Substantial amounts of evidence were presented to various committees of Congress
... that Communist leaders of labor unions had in the past and would continue in the
future to subordinate legitimate trade union objectives to obstructive strikes when
dictated by Party leaders, often in support of the policies of a foreign government.
Id. at 388.
120. Id. at 418 (emphasis added).
121. If the statute before us required labor union officers to forswear membership in
the Republican Party, the Democratic Party or the Socialist Party, I suppose all
agree that it would be unconstitutional. But why, if it is valid as to the Communist
Party?
The answer, for me, is in the decisive differences between the Communist Party
and every other party of any importance in the long experience of the United States
with party government.
Id. at 422.
122. Id. at 424.
123. See, e.g., Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366 (1898); Lochner v. New York, 193 U.S.
45, 56 (1905); Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934); Vest Coast Hotel Co. v.
Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1936). Cf. Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) ; Duplex Printing
Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443, 488 (1921) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). See Bickel &
Wellington, supra note 104, at 29.
19621
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
trespass upon what is properly the legislative province-the promulgation of
the rules by which our society is governed.
Thus, the due process standard of reasonableness would permit Congress
to conclude that disloyal persons are more likely than not to obstruct com-
merce and that therefore they should not be officers of labor unions. But
the Douds case presented a wholly different problem. The issue there was not
the propriety of a general legislative rule, but the validity of the application by
Congress of such a broad rule to a fairly specific group of persons. As to
this problem the implications of our traditional separation of powers are quite
different. For when broad rules are applied to specific persons, in criminal or
civil trials (the antithesis of rule-making proceedings), our society demands
proof "beyond a reasonable doubt" or, at least, proof by a preponderance of the
evidence, not mere reasonableness or rationality. Moreover, the proof offered
must be subjected to all the truth-finding pressures of the adversary system.
Of course the distinction between rules of general applicability and the ap-
plication of such rules to particular persons or groups is not a clear one. The
separation of powers must therefore be viewed as setting up a continuum. At
one extreme is the creation of broad policy judgments--general rules. These
are left to the highly political, nonadversary legislative process. To demand
more than a reasonable judgment at this level would be to trespass upon the
legislative province. At the other extreme is the application of such a broad
rule to a particular individual. Here our system demands that the decision be
made under the circumstances most likely to insure fairness and certainty.
This generally calls for an adversary proceeding accompanied by traditional
judicial safeguards.
This continuum has been tacitly recognized by the courts in their re-
view of the decisions of administrative agencies. Insofar as an administrative
decision constitutes broad "rulemaking," courts hold the agency to no more
than the legislative standard of reasonableness. 124 But when an administra-
tive decision applies a broad rule to particular persons, the proceeding is
labelled "adjudicatory" and the agency is required to accord the individual in
question most of the safeguards of the judicial process. 126
Of course the recognition of such a continuum yields no easy answer to
where rulemaking ends and adjudication begins. But as with all such legal
124. [C]ourts ... almost always (theoretically always) refrain from substituting Judg-
ment as to the content of a legislative rule.... A legislative rule is valid and is as
binding upon a court as a statute if it is (a) within the granted power, (b) issued
pursuant to proper procedure, and (c) reasonable.
DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATisE § 5.03 (1958).
125. Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 442 (1960). See Administrative Procedure Act§ 5 (Adjudication), 60 Stat. 239 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1005 (1958). Compare id. § 4 (Rule
Making), 60 Stat. 238 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1004 (1958).
In absence of statutory requirement of hearing, and in absence of a dispute of ad-
judicative facts, the case law ordinarily does not require either a speech-making hear-
ing or a trial-type hearing for rule making.
DAvis, op. cit. supra note 124, § 6.12 (emphasis added).
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constructs, mere verbalization does not purport to solve all problems of ap-
plication. The extreme cases-which are relatively easy to identify-establish
guidelines for application of the continuum to the more difficult middle areas.
As a given determination partakes more of "adjudication" and less of "rule-
making," more in the way of certainty-and thus, in most cases, more in the
way of judicial safeguards-is required by the Constitution.
Thus Congress may enact a law providing that no one possessing a given
characteristic (e.g., racial intolerance) shall work for the Civil Rights Division,
but it may not provide that John Kasper, or the members of the Ku Klux
Klan, be so restricted.3 6 For in order to arrive at the conclusion that Kasper
or the Klan. members are racially intolerant, it is necessary to gather and
evaluate empirical data pertaining to these men. The bill of attainder clause
is an implementation of the belief that the legislature is a tribunal unsuited
to conducting such an investigation. It demands that whenever an individual
is "tried" to see whether he comes within the purview of a broad mandate, he
be tried in the proceeding best adapted to safeguard his rights and dispassion-
ately seek the truth-a trial before an adjudicatory body.
But this need not imply that a legislature may never phrase a statute so
that it applies a restriction to a specific group of persons. For there are times
when, even in the absence of a judicial hearing, application can be certain.
For example, the statute "No person afflicted with grand mal epilepsy 1_^
shall drive an automobile" is generally conceded to be permissible regulatory
legislation. 2 8 Yet it applies its restriction to a particular group of persons-
grand mal epileptics. Further, in passing this law the legislature has proceeded
along lines arguably similar to those outlined in connection with the Ku
Klux Klan statute. Starting with the proposition that persons possessing
characteristic x (the propensity to have uncontrollable fits), when placed in
situation y (in an automobile on a highway) may well cause z (an accident),
the legislature has determined that persons having characteristic x shall re-
frain from driving (or pay a penalty). But, it might be argued, the legislature
has also applied this general rule: it has determined that a specific group of
persons-grand mal epileptics (a class of persons which, like the members of
the Klan, could be listed at the time of the passage of the statute)-have
characteristic x and therefore must suffer deprivation y (or y').'-m
126. As to the claim that government employment is a "privilege" and that therefore
its deprivation cannot constitute a bill of attainder, see notes 150-66 infra and accompanying
text.
127. See DONNFLLY, GOLDSTEIN & SCHWARTZ, CRIMINAL LAW 585-6 (1962).
128. See Wormuth, Legislative Disqualifications as Bills of Attainder, 4 V,.w. L. Rev.
603, 609 (1951).
129. The problem of distinguishing such statutes from bills of attainder has rarely been
faced in either the case law or the literature. However, two possible distinctions have been
suggested. Professor Wormuth has argued that the epileptic statute is not a bill of attainder
because it does not involve a "censorial judgment" on the part of the legislature. That is,
the legislature has not inquired into the "character," "culpability" or "guilt" of the epileptics.
Wormuth, supra note 128, at 608-10 (1951). See FREuI, ADmmsTrATv Po\ns ovE
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A return to the rationale underlying the bill of attainder clause, however,
discloses that the statute does not possess the evils of a bill of attainder. For
the legislature has not !"tried" the class of persons called grand mal epileptics
at all. Starting with the principle that persons who are subject to uncontrol-
lable fits should not be allowed on the road, the legislature has, it is true,
specified a class of persons who are to be so restricted. But the judgment
that grand mal epileptics are persons susceptible to fits (possess characteristic
x), requires no "trial" of the persons involved, no collection and evaluation of
empirical data concerning them. That "grand mal epileptics" are "persons
susceptible to fits" follows from the very meaning of the words involved. The
judgment is tautological; empirical evidence about the persons is totally ir-
relevant to the decision. The only empirical judgment made by this legislature
-that people subject to fits, if allowed to drive, are likely to cause accidents-
was made earlier, at the general rule-making level.
The bill of attainder clause, was adopted to keep the legislature from making
judgments the framers considered the legislative branch unable to make in
a calm, unbiased fashion; it would be nonsense to say that the legislature is
subject to pressures which render it incapable of making fairly the definitional
judgment-if it can be termed a "judgment"-that grant mal epileptics are
subject to fits. The legislative process is fully as capable of insuring fairness
and certainty in applying its broad rule to grand mal epileptics as any tribunal
would be. No evidence is relevant; no case or controversy exists; no trial is
needed.180  -
PERSONS AND PROPERTY 100 (1928). The "censorial judgment" test would appear to be but
a variant of the traditional "punitive intent" test and subject to the same difficulties. See notes
137-41 infra and accompanying text. The statute "John Jones, because he is an epileptic, shall
not drive," is a bill of attainder, despite the lack of any normative judgment as to Jones.
A second possible ground of distinction which has been suggested by the cases and the litera-
ture is that the epileptic statute is not a bill of attainder because it enacts a "reasonable
qualification" for driving. See, e.g., Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114 (1889) ; Hawker v.
New York, 170 U.S. 189 (1898) ; Garner v. Board of Public Works of Los Angeles, 341 U.S.
716, 720-24 (1951) ; Linehan v. Waterfront Comm'n of New York Harbor, 347 U.S. 439
(1954). See generally Comment, 63 YALE L.J. 844, 850-55 (1954). But this attempted distinc-
tion also fails, for it does not greatly strain the Ku Klux Klan statute to couch it in terms
of a "qualification." Just as an epileptic is not qualified to be on the roads because of the
likelihood of his causing an accident, so, it can be argued, a member of the Klan is not
qualified to work for the Civil Rights Division (or a given rebel is not qualified to live in
England) because of his propensities.
130. Only when the legislature decrees that "John Jones, because he is subject to fits
shall henceforth not be permitted to drive" does it usurp the function of the judiciary by
"trying" a specific individual in order to determine whether or not he comes within the
general rule it has laid down. For the determination that John Jones falls within the class
of persons subject to fits does not follow from the meaning of "John Jones"; this judgment
cannot be made without mustering empirical evidence about John Jones.
Quaere: Is there a definite line between "tautological" and "judicially noticeable" judg-
ments? Or does repeated empirical experience lead us to incorporate additional elements into
our "definitions" of various terms? "'Bachelors' are not married" is clearly a nonempirical
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Even a statute specifically naming the party to whom its deprivations are to
attach need not, in every case, be a bill of attainder. A legislature might de-
termine, for example, that persons whose last names exceed twenty letters
shall not be permitted to list their names in the telephone directory.13 1 It
might implement this broad judgment by specifically enacting that "John
Kensington-Heidelburg-Coyle shall not be permitted to list his name in the
telephone directory." Suspect though it may be on other constitutional
grounds, such a statute would probably not be a bill of attainder. For the judg-
ment that John Kensington-Heidelburg-Coyle's last name exceeds twenty
letters is, again, definitional. No trial was necessary; the erection of judicial
safeguards would be of slight importance.1 32
Perhaps even the statute "No woman with syphilis may marry" is per-
missible, even though the legislature has applied its broad judgment-that no
one likely to bear syphilitic children shall marry-to a specific class: women
with syphilis. The judgment that syphilitic women are likely to bear syphili-
tic children is, to be sure, not definitional. Rather, it is based upon empirical
observation of the children of syphilitics. But it is probably a permissible judg-
ment for the legislature to make, because it is based upon a universally ac-
cepted empirical generalization which is capable of certain verification. Were
the proposition to become relevant during a judicial proceeding, it would prob-
able be labelled "judicially noticeable."''1 This means that no evidence would
observation. "'Grand mal epileptics' are likely to have fits" begins to look more like
"'Syphilitics' are likely to bear diseased children." This Comment proposes, however, that
the "epileptics" statement is tautological in the sense that the term "grand mal epileptics"
was created to refer to persons subject to fits, whereas "syphilitics" was clearly not created
to refer to persons likely to bear syphilitic children. In any case the line is not a clear one.
This fact can, however, make little difference to the analysis presented in this Comment, for
it is proposed that both definitional and judicially noticeable propositions are permissible
legislative inferences. See notes 133-36 infra and accompanying text.
131. Such a judgment is not beyond the realm of possibility. Compare the celebrated
case of A Inc. v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 373
P.2d 31 (Okla. Sup. Ct. 1962).
132. The consideration urged at notes 108-09 supra and accompanying text would,
however, even in cases where there is no chance of legislative non-objectivity or error,
militate against permitting the legislature to specify the objects of its mandates.
133. [W]e have here an important extension of judicial notice to the new field of facts
'capable of accurate and ready demonstration,' ... In this realm fall most of the
facts, theories, and conclusions which have come to be established and accepted by
the specialists in the areas of natural science....
McCopa.cK, EViDENCE § 325, at 691-92 (1954). See State v. Schriber, 185 Ore. 615, 205 P.2d
149 (1949) (judicially noticeable that Bang's disease is an infectious and contagious disease
of cattle).
Also judicially noticeable are facts "so certainly known as to make [them] indisputable
among reasonable men." McCoamcx, op. cit. supra § 324. Under the test proposed by this
Comment, these facts too would be "legislatively noticeable."
To the extent that the proposition that the children of syphilitics are likely to have
syphilis is controversial and not judicially noticeable, reliance upon it by a legislature
would be inappropriate, and reliance upon it here is misplaced.
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have to be adduced to support it. It is thus regarded as so certain that, even
in a judicial context, it would be accepted as true without going through the
customary channels of the adversary process. Since it is difficult to perceive
wherein it is a judgment any less certain if made by a legislature, it would
seem to be irrelevant which department makes it. The only danger in per-
mitting legislatures to make applications of rules based upon such "judicially
noticeable" propositions is that the test might be so loosely construed that it
would serve as little more of a check than the inappropriate "reasonableness"
test. If the right to judicial application of rules is to be preserved, the test of
"judicial notice" must be construed as strictly here as it has been in a court-
room context.
Thus, when empirical evidence is irrelevant to the issue of whether a general
legislative mandate applies to a particular person or group-as when the
judgment is definitional or so universally acknowledged to be certain as to be
"judicially noticeable"-a more specific legislative judgment is permissible, or,
in other words, the legislature may apply its own rules. For a judicial hear-
ing is not needed fairly to make such determinations. But as soon as empirical
evidence becomes relevant to deciding that a broad rule applies to specific per-
sons, the application of the rule must be left to that type of proceeding the
founding fathers determined was best able fairly to execute it-a judicial
trial.1 34 The Douds opinions rightly recognized that Congress needed much
empirical evidence to determine that members of the Communist Party are
persons who, because of their disloyalty, are likely to obstruct the flow of com-
merce. 3 r For neither "disloyal" nor "likely to obstruct commerce" follows
from the meaning of "member of the Communist Party," nor is the proposi-
tion that Communists possess these characteristics judicially noticeable.1 30 In
enacting section 9(h), Congress "tried" the class of members of the Com-
munist Party. In so doing they overstepped their jurisdiction: "No bill of at-
tainder shall be passed."
134. There would seem to be no theoretical objection to having such focused adjudica-
tion performed by an administrative agency, provided that the agency is set up in such a way
that (1) it must respect the safeguards put upon judicial trials, and (2) it is isolated from
the pressures, noted at notes supra 101-07 and accompanying text, which render the legisla-
ture incapable of fairly deciding to whom the rule is to apply. (Quacre: would this require
lifetime tenure?) Such a scheme would both avoid the danger of overconcentration of power
in the hands of the legislature and force the legislature clearly to define the objects of its
legislation. See notes 112-13 supra and accompanying text. See Subversive Activities Control
Act §§ 12-13, 64 Stat. 997-1001 (1950), 50 U.S.C. §§ 791-92 (1958).
135. See notes 119-22 supra and accompanying text.
136. But cf. Matter of Albertson (Lubin), 8 N.Y.2d 77, 84-85, 168 N.E.2d 242 (1960),
rev'd sub. nom. Communist Party v. Catherwood, 367 U.S. 389 (1961), apparently judicially
noticing facts about the Communist Party because Congress had stated them in the form of
legislation I (Needless to say, this holding does not imply that the facts are judicially notice-




The Requirement of Punishment
It has long been the law of the land-colcurred in by literalist 1 37 and func-
tionalist ' 3 8 alike-that if a statute is to be held a bill of attainder, it must inflict
"punishment." This requirement has been thought to be essential to dis-
tinguishing bills of attainder from regulations such as the epileptic statute
considered above. But the validity of this sort of permissible regulatory
legislation can be established on grounds wholly unrelated to the concept
of punishment.139 Further, courts have encountered endless conceptual dif-
ficulties in trying to decide whether given statutes are "punitive.' 40
Even leaving aside the difficulties inherent in ascertaining punitive intent,
the "punishment" test seems to furnish at best an inexact, emotive distinction.
For it is difficult to see in what sense a typical bill of attainder calling for the
banishment of a number of notorious rebels inflicts "punishment" any more
than does a statute providing that no grand neal epileptic shall drive an auto-
mobile. In each case the legislature has moved to prevent a given group of
individuals from causing an undesirable situation, by keeping that group
from a position in which they will be capable of bringing about the feared
events. The "legislative intent"--insofar as that phrase is meaningful-in
the two cases is probably identical.
137. See, e.g., Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 613 (1960).
138. See, e.g., Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 WalL) 277, 323 (1866) ; Communist
Party of the United States v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 146 (1961)
(Black, J., dissenting) ; DOUGLAS, AN ALMANAC OF LiDERTY 103 (1954). But see Flemming
v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 626 (1960) (Black, J. dissenting). See note 17 stpra.
139. Note 130 supra and accompanying text.
It would appear that the requirement of punishment has been thought to follow logically
from the fact that the bill of attainder clause was designed to keep separate the legislative
and judicial functions. See Comment, 64 Y.LE L.J. 712,723 (1955).
Recognizing the danger of political retaliation prompted by a strong executive or a
popular legislature, our Constitution allotted to the judiciary, less sensitive to
transitory whims and passions and more disciplined with the traditions of impartiality
and objectivity, the power to deal directly with narrow groups and individuals. The
legislature cannot punish; that the judiciary must do.
Note, 34 INn. L.. 231, 237 (1959). But no such inference need be made; a desire to separate
the legislature and the judiciary implies nothing about "punishment."
140. There have been a few decisions to the effect that certain deprivations-regardless
of the intent with which they are inflicted-can never be "punishment." See notes 142, 150-51
infra and accompanying text. However, it has generally been stated that "punitive intent"
on the part of the legislature is the key to determining whether or not a prescribed depriva-
tion is "punishment." See, e.g., Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 94 (1958) ; Flemming v. Nestor,
363 U.S. 603, 613-14 (1960) ; Wormuth, supra note 128, at 608-10. Where such intent does
not appear on the face of the statute, it has been sought in the thicket of legislative history.
See, e.g., Trop v. Dulles, supra at 94-95 (1958) ; Flemming v. Nestor, supra at 618-21
(1960) ; id. at 638-40 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Comment, 64 YALE L.J. 712, 725 (1955) ;
Note, 34 IND. L.J. 231, 249 (1959). But see Starkweather v. Blair, 245 Minn. 371, 379-80,
71 NAV2d 869, 875-76 (1955). And if neither the words of the statute nor the legislative
history reveal such punitive intent, it has been argued with no small degree of circularity
that a court may infer "hidden intent" from the fact that the effect of the statute is "to
punish." Note, 34 IND. L.J. 231,250 (1959).
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The breakdown of the "punishment" test is more clearly illustrated by'
contrasting the statutes "No one afflicted with a contagious disease shall teach
school" and "John Jones, because te has a contagious disease, shall not teach
school." Even outspoken adherents of the punishment test admit that the latter
is a bill of attainder, 41 yet it is no more "punitive" than the former. For both
the deprivation inflicted and the purpose underlying its infliction are identical.
The second statute offends the bill of attainder prohibition not because of any
"punitive intent," but because the legislature has taken unto itself the power to
apply its general mandate to a specific individual. Thus, in pursuing the
phantom "punitive intent," the courts have been focusing on the wrong issue.
The bill of attainder clause was directed not to the intent of the legislature, but
to the preservation of the separation of powers. It was adopted not to prevent
legislative "punishment," but to prevent legislative trial.
The Form of Deprivation
Threading the case law are holdings to the effect that the nature of the
deprivation inflicted can alone determine that an act is not a bill of attainder,
regardless of the fact that the deprivation is inflicted upon a specific group, and
regardless of the intent with which the statute was enacted. Typical is the
line of cases holding that laws providing for the deportation of alien Com-
munists are not bills of attainder (or ex post facto laws), because deportation
of aliens is simply "not a punishment.' 42
The view that the nature of the deprivation inflicted can be dispositive of
whether an act is constitutional makes no sense in a bill of attainder context.
Not even those who claim to draw their definition from history can rely upon
such reasoning, for the bills of attainder (and bills of pains and penalties) of
Revolutionary America and pre-1789 England prescribed a great variety of
deprivations.' 43 Indeed, banishment numbered among the more common sanc-
tions. 44
141. Mr. Justice Jackson confuses the two. He says: "I have sometimes wondered why
I must file papers showing I did not steal my car before I can get a license for it."
339 U.S. at 435 ... This is very different from an act which says: "Robert H. Jack-
son for want of qualification is hereby forbidden to own or operate an automobile."
Wormuth, supra note 128, at 610 n.37.
142. E.g., Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 730 (1893); Bugajewitz v.
Adams, 228 U.S. 585, 591 (1913) ; Mahler v. Eby, 264 U.S. 32, 39 (1924) ; 1larislades v.
Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 594-95 (1952) ; Quattrone v. Nicolls, 210 F.2d 513, 518 (1st
Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 976 (1954). See also Turner v. Williams, 194 U.S.
279 (1904) ; Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302 (1955). Cf. Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 531
(1954).
. However, expatriation of a citizen has been held to be "punishment." Klapprott v. United
States, 335 U.S. 601 (1949); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958); Is re Yung Sing -lice,
36 Fed. 437 (D. Ore. 1888) ; cf. Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44 (1958).
143. See notes 88-91 supra and accompanying text.
144. See, e.g., Proceedings Against Hugh and Hugh Le Despencer 1 State Trials 23
(1320) ; An act to inflict pains and penalties on Francis lord bishop of Rochester, 1722, 9
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Also, early precedent-notably Fletcher v. Peck 145 and Cummings v.
Missouri ' 4q-stands for the view that the bill of attainder clause is not to be
restricted to statutes inflicting any rigidly defined class of deprivations. Flet-
cher specifically rejected the argument that the bill of attainder clause applied
only to statutes inflicting capital sanctions,1 47 while Cummings explicitly re-
pudiated another attempt to narrow the reach of the bill of attainder clause on
the basis of the type of sanction imposed:
We do not agree with the counsel of Missouri that "to punish one is to
deprive him of life, liberty, or property, and that to take from him any-
thing less than these is no punishment at all." The learned counsel ....
does not include under liberty freedom from outrage on the feelings as
well as restraints on the person. He does not include under property those
estates which one may acquire in professions, though they are often the
source of the highest emoluments and honors.14 s
Of course these cases accept the view, criticized above, that if an act is to be
held a bill of attainder, it must inflict "punishment." What is noted here,
however, is that they imply that legislative intent, and not the form or severity
of the deprivation, is dispositive of whether or not punishment has been in-
flicted, and therefore of whether there has been an attainder.
Even more important, however, is the fact that an examination of the ra-
tionale underlying the bill of attainder clause makes clear that the type of
deprivation imposed by a statute is irrelevant to whether or not that statute
falls within the constitutional provision. For the bill of attainder clause
is not a limitation upon the size or sort of sanctions which the legislature can
prescribe ;149 it is rather a command that the legislature shall never, regardless
Geo. 1, c. 17 (Pub.) ; An act for banishing and disenabling the earl of Claredon, 1667, 19 Car.
2, c. 10 (Pub.).
It has been stated that the modem sanction of deportation is not equivalent to the
traditional sanction of banishment. Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 693, 730
(1893). But this does not appear to be a meaningful distinction. See Hesse, The Constitu-
tional Status of the Lawfully Admitted Permanent Resident Alicn: The Inherent Limtits of
The Power to Expel, 69 YALE L.J. 262 (1959). See also Navasky, Deportation as Punish-
ment, 27 U. oF Ykw. Crry L. REv. 213 (1959) ; Comment, 51 YAIz L.J. 1358, 1363-64 (1942).
But even if banishment and deportation did differ in any meaningful way, and the latter
lacked historical counterparts, the rationale underlying the bill of attainder clause implies
that an act subjecting specific persons to deportation would still offend the constitutional
provision. For the form of the deprivation imposed is irrelevant to whether or not the
statute imposing it is a bill of attainder.
See the description of the proposed deportation of Harry Bridges, in Comment, Deporta-
tion amnt Exclusion: A Continuing Dialogue Between Congress and the Courts, 71 YAr.Z
L.J. 760, 783-84 n.112 (1962).
145. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch.) 87 (1810). See notes 21-24 supra and accompanying text.
146. 71 U.S. (4 WalL) 277 (1866). See notes 25-36 supra and accompanying text.
147. Note 22 supra and accompanying text.
148. Cummings v., Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 320 (1866). But ef. Brown v.
Wilemon, 139 F.2d 730, 732 (fth Cir. 1944).
149. Of course other parts of the Constitution do set limits on the severity and form
of deprivations: for instance, the prohibitions against cruel and unusual punishments and of
corruption of blood. U.S. CoNsT. amend. VIII; U.S. CoxsT. art. III, § 3.
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of the type of deprivation the rule imposes, try persons to see if they come
within the rule.
"Mere Denials of Privilege"
There is a considerable body of state authority to the effect that a statute
merely "denying a privilege" to a specific group of persons cannot be a bill
of attainder. This reasoning has been applied most often in cases involving
statutes denying a specific person or group the opportunity to vote 160 or to
hold public office.'
Until very recently, the Supreme Court had consistently rejected this doc-
trine. The Cummings opinion stated that a statute depriving "any rights,
civil or political" could be a bill of attainder.152 The use of the word "rights"
suggests an endorsement of the view that a denial of a privilege cannot be a
punishment. A closer reading, however, discloses that the word "right" was
used by the Court to encompass what other courts have called "privileges,"
and that therefore the case stands for a repudiation of any dichotomy between
the two:
The theory upon which our political institutions rest is, that all men
have certain inalienable rights-that among these are life, liberty, and
the pursuit of happiness; and that in the pursuit of happiness all avoca-
tions, all honors, all positions, are alike open to every one . . . . Any
deprivation or suspension of any of these rights for past conduct is punish-
ment.... 153
This was no inadvertant pronouncement, for among the deprivations inflicted
upon those unable to take the oath at issue in Cummings were denials of the
vote and the opportunity to hold office. 154 And in the Lovett case,16 denial of
compensation for federal employment was held to be a deprivation sufficient
to invalidate the statute as a bill of attainder, despite widespread state authority
to the effect that government employment is a privilege." 0
Since Lovett, however, suggestions of the doctrine that denial of a privilege
cannot constitute punishment have crept into the opinions of the Supreme
Court. In Douds 157 the Court observed that the deprivation imposed by sec-
150. E.g., Anderson v. Baker, 23 Md. 531 (1865) ; Blair v. Ridgely, 41 Mo. 63 (1867) ;
Randolph v. Good, 3 W. Va. 551 (1869) ; Wooley v. Watkins, 2 Idaho 590, 22 Pac. 102
(1889) ; Shepherd v. Grimmett, 3 Idaho 403, 31 Pac. 793 (1892) ; cf. Boyd v. Mills, 53 Kan.
594, 37 Pac. 16 (1894).
151. E.g., State ex rel. Wingate v. Woodson, 41 Mo. 227 (1867) ; Crampton v. O'Mara,
193 Ind. 551, 139 N.E. 360 (1923), appeal dismissed, 267 U.S. 575 (1925) ; cf. City of Detroit
v. AASER, 332 Mich. 237, 51 N.W.2d 228, appeal dismissed, 344 U.S. 805 (1952).
152. Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 320 (1866).
153. Id. at 321-22 (emphasis added). See note 36 supra.
154. Note 27 supra and accompanying text.
155. United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946). See notes 42-45 supra and accomn-
panying text. But cf. Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391 (1938).
156. See note 151 supra.
157. American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950).
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tion 9(h) of the Taft-Hartley Act-the preclusion of recognition by the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board-would have the effect of imposing restrictions
which would not exist if the Board had not been established. 58 The Court
reasoned that it therefore was not "free to treat § 9(h) as if it merely with-
draws a privilege gratuitously granted by the Government. .. ." 9 From this
statement it is not unreasonable to infer that if the Court had felt that section
9(h) did "merely withdraw such a privilege," it might have held the depriva-
tion inflicted insufficient to invalidate the statute. And in Flemming v. Ncstorlco
a 1960 case involving a statute 161 terminating the old-age Social Security
payments of aliens who had been deported for being members of the Com-
munist Party, 62 the doctrine was more strongly suggested. In holding that
the statute was not a bill of attainder, the Court intimated that one reason
underlying its finding was that the deprivation imposed by the statute was
that of a "mere privilege":
Here the sanction is the mere denial of a noncontractual governmental
benefit. No affirmative disability or restraint is imposed, and certainly
nothing approaching the "infamous punishment" of imprisonment .... Ic
Thus the doctrine that a statute "merely denying a privilege" cannot be a
bill of attainder is threatening to establish itself, like the requirement of post
facto punishment and the requirement of the inescapable class, as a technical
limitation upon the reach of the bill of attainder clause. Indeed, a recent district
court decision, in upholding a federal statute against the charge that it was a
bill of attainder, rested squarely upon the right-privilege dichotomyY2"
Certain pre-1789 bills of attainder often inflicted deprivations which look
very much like "mere denials of privilege"; there were statutes depriving the
specified party the vote, 65 and denying to their sons the opportunity of sitting
158. Id. at 389-90.
159. Id. at 390.
160. 363 U.S. 603 (1960).
161. Social Security Act Amendments of 1954 § 107, 68 Stat. 1083 (1954), 42 U.S.C.
§ 402(n) (1958).
162. Immigration and Nationality Act § 241(a) (6) (C), 66 Stat. 205 (1952), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1251 (a) (6) (C) (1958).
163. 363 U.S. at 617. It is not suggested that this was the sole ground of decision, for
the case also discussed "punitive intent" at length. See id. at 612-21. But see notes 13741
supra and accompanying text.
164. Thompson v. Whittier, 185 F. Supp. 306, 310-12 (D.D.C. 1960). But se Steinberg
v. United States, 163 F. Supp. 590,592 (Ct. Cl. 1958).
165. See note 97 supra and accompanying text. See also An Act for the preventing of
bribery and corruption in the election of members to serve in parliament for the borough of
Cricldade, in the county of Wilts, 1782, 22 Geo. 3, c. 31 (Pub.); An Act to exclude the
Bourough of Grampound, in the County of Cornwall, from sending Burgesses to serve in
Parliament..., 1821, 1 &2 Geo. 4, c. 47 (Pub.).
Yet the area of disenfranchisement is the prime bastion of the privilege doctrine. See note
159 supra and accompanying text.
Murphy v. Ramsey, 114 U.S. 15 (1885), a case involving an ex post facto law issue,
strongly suggested that disenfranchisement can be a punishment. Id. at 42.
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in Parliament. 66 Again, however, the fundamental reason that the right-
privilege dichotomy must be rejected is that it does not accord with the ra-
tionale underlying the bill of attainder clause. For the clause is a blanket
prohibition of legislative exercise of the adjudicating function.
ANTI-COMMUNIST LEGISLATION AND THE BILL OF ATTAINDER CLAUSE
The similarity between our age and past "ages of attainder" is startling.
English acts of attainder were almost always directed at persons or groups who
had attempted, or seemed likely to attempt, to overthrow the government.1 01
Indeed, Parliament frequently cited as justification for its action the fact that
the person or group attainted was "under the domination of a foreign
power."'1 8 And the passage of bills of attainder in Revolutionary America
was similarly elicited by widespread fear of another "foreign-dominated"
group, the Tories. John Adams' confession, "I fear there is a chain of toryism
extending from Canada through New York and New Jersey into Pennsyl-
vania,"'169 can sound unfamiliar to no child of the era of the John Birch Society.
But mere historical similarity does not a bill of attainder make. The anti-
Communist legislation presently on the books takes many forms. In order for
any or all of these statutes to be bills of attainder, Congress must not only have
laid down the general rule that persons dangerous to the nation's security
shall be restricted in certain ways, but must also have usurped the function
of the judiciary by itself applying that rule to specific persons.
The statutory provision which most clearly violates the bill of attainder
clause is that section of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 which
provides that aliens who are members of the Communist Party shall be taken
into custody and deported.170 While the bill of attainder clause does not pre-
vent Congress from enacting a statute calling for the deportation of all per-
sons found by a court to be disloyal, or dangerous to America's security, it
does demand that the application of this rule be left to the judicial branch.
But Congress has usurped this function by making the empirical determina-
tion that specific persons-alien Communists-come within the class of persons
dangerous to the nation's security. Since the claim that "deportation is not a
166. See note 92 supra and accompanying text. But sec French v. Senate, 146 Cal. 604,
80 Pac. 1031 (1905).
167. See notes 6-7 stpra and accompanying text.
168. E.g., an Act to inflict pains and penalties on John Plunkett, 1722, 9 Geo. 1, c, 15
(Pub.) ; an Act for the further limitation of the crown, and better securing the rights and
liberties of the subject, 1700, 12 & 13 Will. 3, c. 3; an Act for restraining popish recusants
to some certain places of abode, 1593, 35 Eliz., c. 2 (Pub.). For an interesting parallel, see
Professor Chafee's description of the "Popish Plot." CuAFEE, op. cit. supra note 4, at 122-23.
169. 9 ADAMS, THE LIFE AND WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 408 (1854).
170. Any alien ... shall ... be deported who is or at any time has been, after entry,
a member of [the Communist Party of the United States] ....
66 Stat. 205 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (6) (C) (1958).
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punishment" makes no sense in a bill of attainder context,171 the constitu-
tional prohibition of trial by legislature has been violated.
The Communist Control Act of 1954
The Communist Control Act 172 also specifically names the Communist
Party as the object of its restrictions. Section 3 provides:
The Communist Party of the United States.. [is] not entitled to any of
the rights, privileges, and immunities attendant upon legal bodies created
under the jurisdiction of the laws of the United States or any political
subdivision thereof; and whatever rights, privileges, and immunities
which have heretofore been granted to said party... are hereby termin-
ated.... 173
There has apparently been an empirical determination that the Communist
Party comes within the class of organizations which endanger the national
security and must therefore be restricted. Indeed, Congress, in a classic ex-
ample of the "declaration of guilt" which Mr. Justice Frankfurter considers
essential 74 admitted as much:
The Congress hereby finds and declares that the Communist Party of the
United States, although purportedly a political party, is in fact an in-
strumentality of a conspiracy to overthrow the Government of the United
States .... Therefore the Communist Party should be outlawed 75
This is precisely the sort of "trial by legislature" the bill of attainder clause
was designed to prevent.
Of course, the deprivations imposed by section 3 attach to the group qua
group, rather than directly to the individual members. But even leaving aside
the fact that restrictions placed upon a group constitute indirect restrictions
upon the actions of its members, this distinction cannot make any difference
vis-a-vis the bill of attainder clause. For regardless of whether individual or
collective action is restricted by the statute, the fact remains that Congress has
disregarded the separation of powers by applying its own general rules.170
The Court's opinion in Communist Party v. Catherwoody r holding that
the act does not require exclusion of Communist parties from state unem-
ployment compensation systems, suggests that the "rights, privileges, and im-
munities" clause of section 3 may be construed so narrowly as to inflict es-
sentially no deprivations upon the Communist Party. However, it can be
171. See notes 142-49 supra and accompanying text.
172. 68 Stat. 775-80 (1954), as amended, 50 U.S.C. §§ 781-857 (1958).
173. Communist Control Act § 3, 68 Stat. 776 (1954), 50 U.S.C. § 842 (1958).
174. Notes 52-55 supra and accompanying text.
175. Communist Control Act § 2, 68 Stat. 775-76 (1954), 50 U.S.C. § 841 (1958).
176. A statute providing that United States Steel must surrender all its assets to the
government is a bill of attainder, despite the fact that the deprivation falls upon the "group
qua group.'" Compare Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936). See Comment,
64 YAix L.J. 712, 724 n.74 (1955).
177. 367 U.S. 389 (1961).
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argued that section 2 178 -the "declaration of guilt"-even standing alone,
constitutes a bill of attainder. For although on its face it attaches no conse-
quences to the announced empirical finding, it is bound to elicit community
reaction which may well ultimately result in the infliction of severe depriva-
tions upon Communists.'" Such a view was suggested in 1794 by James Madi-
son when, in a debate over a congressional resolution which did no more than
declare certain persons to have been involved in an insurrection, he observed:
It is in vain to say that this indiscriminate censure is no punishment.
If it falls on classes, or individuals, it will be a severe punishment. ...
Is not this proposition, if voted, a vote of attainder ?1O
The Smith Act of 1940
At the other end of the anti-Communist spectrum stands the Smith Act:
It shall be unlawful for any person-
(3) to organize or help to organize any society, group, or assembly of
persons who teach, advocate, or encourage the overthrow or de-
struction of any Government in the United States by force or vio-
lence; or to be or become a member of, or affiliate with, any such
society, group, or assembly of persons, knowing the purpose
thereof.1 8'
Under the analysis suggested in this Comment, the Smith Act is not a bill of
attainder. In enacting it Congress contented itself with promulgating a rule
of general applicability-that those who knowingly belong to a group which
advocates the violent overthrow of the government shall go to jail; it did not
take the further step of applying this general rule by specifying what persons
or groups were to be so deprived. This job was left to the courts; one
prosecuted under the Smith Act is entitled to a jury trial on the question of
the disloyalty of the group to which he belongs, in addition to his membership
in that group. 8 2
178. Text accompanying note 175 supra.
179. See note 187 infra.
180. 4 Annals of Congress 934 (1794).
The reasoning outlined in the text can with little difficulty be extended to imply that it
is unconstitutional for legislative committees to make and release to the public empirical
findings about specific persons or groups, if the effect of such release will be to inflict de-
privations upon the parties concerned. Of course, such findings are generally not released in
the form of a statute, and to that extent differ from the historical bill of attainder. But
functionally this can make little difference for-regardless of how the finding is announced-
the legislature has disregarded the separation of powers by "trying" particular persons.
Cf. CHAFEE, op. cit. supra note 4, at 159-60.
The passage of "private bills" also represents a breakdown of the separation of powers,
Usually, however, no one would suffer injury sufficient to give standing to challenge this
sort of legislative exercise of the adjudicating function, even if it be admitted that a statute
which does not impose a deprivation can be a bill of attainder.
181. Smith Act § 2(a) (3), 54 Stat. 671 (1940), as amended, 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1958).
182. See Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961).
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The Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950
Situated-both chronologically and along the continuum-between the Com-
munist Control Act and the Smith Act is that part of the Internal Security Act
known as the Subversive Activities Control Act.183 Section 3 defines a "Com-
munist-action organization" as:
[A]ny organization in the United States . . . which (i) is substantially
directed, dominated, or controlled by the foreign government or foreign
organization controlling the world Communist movement referred to in
section 2 of this title, and (ii) operates primarly to advance the objec-
tives of such world Communist movement... 184
Under section 7, every organization coming within this definition is required
to file with the Attorney General a registration statement, which is to include,
inter alia, the names and addresses of all its members. 185 From such registra-
tion (or a final order of the Subversive Activities Control Board requiring
registration) 186 flow many severe deprivations.18 7
183. 64 Stat. 987 (1950) ; 50 U.S.C. §§ 781-98 (1958).
184. Subversive Activities Control Act § 3,64 Stat. 989 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 782 (1958).
185. Id. § 7,64 Stat. at 994 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 786 (1958).
186. Id. § 12(e), 64 Stat. at 997 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 791(e) (1958).
187. Members of an organization designated a "Communist-action organization" are de-
prived of certain income tax exemptions. Subversive Activities Control Act § 11(a), 64
Stat. 996 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 790(a) (1958). Further, such persons and organizations are
denied access to the National Labor Relations Board either as an employer or as the
representative of any employee. Communist Control Act §§ 6, 13A(h), 68 Stat. 777, 779-80
(1954), 50 U.S.C. §§ 784(a) (1) (E), 792a(h) (1958). Also, "Communist-action organiza-
tions" cannot send mail or broadcast over radio or television without announcing that the
information is being "disseminated by a Communist organization!' Subversive Activities
Control Act § 10, 64 Stat. 996 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 789 (1958). (The use of restrictions upon
the opportunity to communicatei as a means of containing a threat to the national security,
is far from novel; in its attainder of the Prince of Vales, Parliament decreed:
And for preventing traiterous correspondence between your Majesty's subjects and
the said pretended prince of Wales, or his adherents; be it further enacted... That
if any of the Subjects of the Crown of England ... shall .. . hold, entertain, or
keep any intelligence or correspondence in person, or by letters, messages, or other-
wise, with the said pretended prince of Wales, or with any person or persons em-
ployed by him, knowing such person to be so employed ... such person so offending,
being lawfully convicted, shall be taken, deemed, and adjudged to be guilty of high
treason, and shall suffer and forfeit as in cases of high treason.
An act for the Attainder of the pretended Prince of Wales of High Treason ,1701, 13 Will.
3, c. 3 (pub.). (Of course this section of the act is not a bill of attainder.)
Registration under § 7 of the Subversive Activities Control Act also inflicts depriva-
tions directly upon the individual members of a Communist-action organization. They are
forbidden to "hold any non-elective office or employment under the United States," "engage
in any employment in any defense facility," or "hold office or employment with any labor
organization... or to represent any employer in any matter or proceeding arising or pend-
ing" under the National Labor Relations Act. Subversive Activities Control Act §§
5(a)(1)(B), 5(a)(1)(D), 64 Stat. 992 (1950), 50 U.S.C. §§ 784(a)(1)(B), 784(a)
(1) (d) (1958) ; Communist Control Act § 6, 68 Stat. 777 (1954), 50 U.S.C. § 784(a)
(1) (E) (1958). Members are also ineligible for passports. Subversive Activities Control
Act§ 6(a), 64 Stat. 993 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 785 (1958).
1962]
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
I
The Subversive Activities Control Act presents a difficult problem, be-
cause it does not neatly fit into either the category "rulemaking" or the cate-
gory "adjudication." The analysis suggested in this Comment would approach
this problem by first determining what sort of judgment Congress has made in
enacting the statute.18 8 It has not made a very broad judgment: "Any or-
ganization which operates primarily to aid an enemy of the United States in its
efforts to defeat the United States shall . . ." Nor has it specifically applied
a judgment to a particular person or group: "The Communist Party of the
United States shall . . .,"113 Its judgment lies somewhere between these ex-
tremes. Thus neither the test of "reasonableness" nor the test of "certainty"
should be applied to decide the validity of the enactment. It can, however,
be forcefully argued that Congress has, in narrowing the breadth of its rule,
made significant and not wholly uncontroversial empirical findings concerning
the existence, government, aims, and power of the World Communist movement.
In answer it might be urged that the enacted definition is not so far removed
from the broad rulemaking level as to deny Congress the use of such uncertain
empirical data. 90
Further, the list of members' names is to be kept open for public inspection. Subversive
Activities Control Act § 9(b), 54 Stat. 996 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 788(b) (1958). Thus the
chances of additional deprivations, inflicted by the community, are increased. For example,
Communist lawyers and doctors are faced with the possibility of exclusion from their pro-
fessions, while teachers and actors who are past or present members of the Party are con-
fronted with serious problems in obtaining employment. See Konigsberg v. State Bar of
California, 366 U.S. 36 (1961) ; Barsky v. Board of Regents, 347 U.S. 442 (1954) ; Adler v,
Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485 (1952) ; Horowitz, Loyalty Tests for Employment h the Mo-
tion Picture Industry, 6 STAN. L. REv. 438 (1954).
188. Courts have used legislative history as an aid to determining whether or not a
statute is a bill of attainder. Note 140 supra. This procedure has been endorsed by com-
mentators. See Note, 34 IND. L. REv. 231, 249 (1959) ; Comment, 64 YALE L.J. 712, 725
(1955). The analysis presented in this Comment does not draw upon legislative history. For
although legislative history may be an indispensable aid so long as the issue is couched in
terms of "punitive intent," it does not appear to be the most reliable indicator of whether or
not a statute singles out specific parties to whom the statute is to apply.
Even if it could be demonstrated that the legislative debates consisted largely of the ex.
amination of evidence concerning a specific group, that fact alone would not demonstrate
that the final form of the statute specifically applies the general rule involved to that group.
To determine whether a given statute not only sets forth a general rule that persons with
characteristic x shall be subjected to deprivation y, but also incorporates an empirical
judgment that a specific list of persons possess characteristic r, courts must turn to the
statute itself.
189. The argument that the full panoply of statutes, read together, permits of no con-
clusion other than that the Communist Party comes within the language of § 3 has been
rejected by the Court. Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1,
i10-15 (1961).
190. The ultimate inquiry must be: were the empirical underpinnings of the narrow-
ing of the rule certain enough considering the specificity of the application? A more
"absolute" test would no doubt be easier to apply to the difficult middle areas between pure
rulemaking and pure adjudication. Cf. Black, Mr. Justice Black, The Supreme Court, and
the Bill of Rights, Harper's Magazine, Feb. 1961. However, it is probably the case that the
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The issue was rendered moot in 1954 when, in section 4 of the Communist
Control Act,191 Congress took the step it had refrained from taking four years
earlier:
Whoever knowingly and willfully becomes or remains a member of...
the Communist Party... with knowledge of the purpose or objective of
such organization shall be subject to all the provisions and penalties
of the [Subversive Activities Control Act,] as a member of a "Com-
munist-action" organization.19 2
The Court has held that section 2 of the 1954 Act 'O3 -the "declaration of
guilt"--is a mere statement of congressional purpose and cannot be read back
into the Subversive Activities Control Act.10 4 But this section, section 4-
which explicitly refers to the 1950 Act-admits of no such interpretation.
When the restrictions placed upon the members of "Communist-action or-
ganizations" by the 1950 Act are coupled with this 1954 declaration that mem-
bers of the Communist Party are to be treated as members of a "Communist-
action organization," there emerges the very model of a modem bill of attain-
der. Congress has not contented itself with its former generalization that mem-
bers of organizations which possess certain characteristics shall be subject to
certain restrictions; it has gone on to apply this rule specifically to the Com-
munist Party. The separation of powers has broken down; Congress has
passed a bill of attainder.195
continuum here proposed cannot be translated into "absolute" terms. Because there is no
sharp distinction between "broad rules" and "specifications thereof," a rule like "a legisla-
ture can never specify the persons who are to be subject to its broad rule, unless it does so
by means of definitions or judicially noticeable propositions," cannot be utilized without
degenerating into the sort of inquiry set forth at the beginning of this footnote. The con-
tinuum, as the text demonstrates, is not difficult to apply to most legislation; as to the mid-
dle areas, it can do no more than suggest the approach.
191. See notes 172-80 supra and accompanying text.
192. Communist Control Act § 4(a), 68 Stat. 776 (1954), 50 U.S.C. § 843 (1958).
193. Text accompanying note 175 supra.
194. Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 115 (1961).
195. It has been suggested by adherents of the literalist approach that an attempt to
determine the meaning and scope of the bill of attainder clause is something of a waste of
time because the more general standard of "due process" affords sufficient protection
against the evils to which the bill of attainder clause is directed.
Congress omitted from § 304 any condemnation for which the presumed punishment
was a sanction. Thereby it negatived the essential notion of a bill of attainder. It
may be said that such a view of a bill of attainder offers Congress too easy a mode of
evading the prohibition of the Constitution. Congress need merely omit its ground of
condemnation and legislate the penalty I But the prohibition against a 'Bill of At-
tainder" is only one of the safeguards of liberty in the arsenal of the Constitution.
There are other provisions in the Constitution, specific and comprehensive, effectively
designed to assure the liberties of our citizens.
United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 326 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). See also
Note, 26 OR& L. Rxv. 78, 109-13 (1947).
This sort of attack can be answered simply by pointing out that although it is arguable
that the concept of "due process" should encompass a prohibition of legislative adjudication,
(but caveat: the separation of powers as we know it is primarily an American phenomenon),
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CONCLUSION
Of late the Supreme Court, claiming it is bound by the chains of history,
has limited the bill of attainder clause to a degree to which it has never before
been limited. But the allegedly historical assumptions of the Court do not stand
up to the test of history, for pre-Constitution bills of attainder were so varied
in form and effect that the formulation of any narrow historical definition is
impossible.
Indeed, writings contemporary with the adoption of the Constitution indi-
cate that the clause was intended as a broad implementation of the separation
of powers-that it was designed to limit the legislature in much the same way
as the case and controversy requirement of article III limits the judiciary.
This broad purpose should dominate future judicial constructions of the con-
stitutional provision.
This Comment has analyzed only legislation directed at members of the
Communist Party. This emphasis results not from design or sympathy, but
from necessity. For it is the Communists who are the targets of today's bills of
attainder. This is not surprising, for such bills have always been directed at
those thought to present a threat to the security of the sovereign. Yesterday it
the recent cases demonstrate that the Court's definition does not extend that far. For such
flagrant instances of legislative adjudication as § 9(h) of the Taft-Hartley Act have been
upheld not only against the charge that they are bills of attainder, but also against attacks
grounded in the due process clause. See cases cited note 46 supra. To suggest that one con-
stitutional provision is useless because another provision, if its present interpretation were
altered, might perform the same function is nothing short of absurd.
Bills of attainder are often at the same time ex post facto laws; this no doubt is one rea-
son the two prohibitions were united in one constitutional clause. But the proscription of ex
post facto laws does not, as has at times been suggested, render the bill of attainder pro-
hibition superfluous, for frequently bills of attainder were-and are-not ex post facto laws.
For one thing, parliamentary bills of attainder often were findings that the person attainted
was guilty of a crime previously defined by the statutes. Secondly, bills of attainder were
sometimes passed not primarily to punish past acts at all, but rather to prevent future con-
duct. Notes 56-67 mupra and accompanying text. The classes of "bills of attainder" and "ex
post facto laws" are thus overlapping but not coextensive; the framers were fully justified in
treating the two prohibitions separately. Note 11 supra. It is also worth noting that while
there is in the case law authority for the proposition that the prohibition of ex post facto
laws is limited to criminal statutes-as is the Sixth Amendment's guaranty of trial by
jury-the authority concerning the bill of attainder clause explicitly rejects such limitation.
Compare Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dali.) 386 (1798), and Mahler v. Eby, 264 U.S. 32,
39 (1924), with Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1867), and United States v.
Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946).
So long as the bill of attainder clause is regarded as a proscription of a specific form
of parliamentary statute, it can be convincingly argued that it is a safeguard of little inde-
pendent value in today's world. However, once it is realized that the term "bill of attainder"
has no specific historical referent, and that the constitutional provision is a prohibition of
legislative adjudication in any guise, it becomes clear that it is a safeguard which is, especial.
ly today, independently vital. If the courts are led to read the bill of attainder clause out of
the Constitution as anachronistic surplusage, we shall have lost the right to be judged
by persons other than those who enact the law.
BILLS OF ATTAINDER
was the Prince of Wales ;19 today it is the Communists. As Story wisely
observed:
Bills of this sort have most usually been passed in England in times of re-
bellion, or of gross subserviency to the crown, or of violent political e.x-
citements; periods, in which all nations are most liable (as well the free
as the enslaved) to forget their duties, and to trample upon the rights and
liberties of others.
This is not surprising, when we consider that coolness, caution, and a
strict regard for the rights and liberties of others, are the accompani-
ments of conscious security and strength, and are not to be looked for
in times of great danger, when the people regard their all as being
staked upon the issue of a doubtful contest, and when it is of the utmost
importance to their cause, that by every possible means they force doubt-
ful parties to take sides with them, and lessen the power, number, and
means of offense of those opposed.
197
It is easy to understand why Congress has not been willing to entrust to
other tribunals the power to determine who is to come within the purview of
its rules. But the fact that something is understandable does not make it
constitutional.
We live in an age of anxiety. But so did the framers of our Constitution.
We would do well to heed their warning that, in calm and anxious ages alike,
the "accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the
same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditaxy, self-
appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of
tyranny."' 98
196. Act for the Attainder of the pretended Prince of Wales, 1701, 13 Will. 3, c. 3
(pub.). See notes 64-65 supra and accompanying text.
197. STORY, op. cit. supra note 5, at 210-11.
198. THE FEDERALiST No. 47, op. cit. mipra note 100, at 373-74 (Madison).
1962)
